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Liberté, Egalité, et Fraternité at Risk for  
New Religious Movements in France∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the past several years, the French government has sys-
tematically targeted the freedoms of new religious movements 
(“NRMs”)1 with legislative initiatives.2 On June 22, 2000, the 
 
∗   My interest in this topic stems from my experience as a volunteer missionary for the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in France beginning in the fall of 1995. While the 
LDS Church has not been officially listed as a secte, I encountered first-hand as a missionary the 
effects of anti-sect sentiment, specifically those arising out of the tragic Ordre du Temple Solaire 
deaths in southeastern France in the fall of 1995. Notwithstanding my affection for the French 
people and French culture, this Comment attempts to objectively critique French legislative 
initiatives from a legal standpoint. I thank my husband and classmate John M. Smith for his 
many insightful suggestions at various stages of this work. I also thank Professor W. Cole Dur-
ham, Jr., without whose interest and advocacy this Comment may never have been written. 
The author takes sole responsibility for any errors in this Comment. 
 1. Scholars prefer to use the term “new religious movement” rather than “cult” be-
cause of the latter’s pejorative cast. See, e.g., ELISABETH ARWECK & PETER B. CLARKE, NEW 
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE (1997); W. Cole Durham, Jr., The United 
States’ Experience with New Religious Movements, in NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN THE 
USA 213, 213 n.1 (1998); Pierre-Henri Prelot, Les nouveaux mouvements religieux et le droit; 
la situation française, in NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS AND THE LAW IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 159 (European Consortium for Church-State Research ed., 1999); JOHN A. SALIBA, 
UNDERSTANDING NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS (1995); James T. Richardson & Barend van 
Driel, New Religious Movements in Europe: Developments and Reactions, in ANTI-CULT 
MOVEMENTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (Anson Shupe & David G. Bromley eds., 
1994). The term, new religious movement, is itself difficult to define because of the broad ar-
ray of religious groups that find themselves lumped into this category. The tendency has been 
to regard religious movements that emerged in the West after the 1960s as “new.” See JAMES 
A. BECKFORD, CULT CONTROVERSIES: THE SOCIETAL RESPONSE TO NEW RELIGIOUS 
MOVEMENTS 13-14 (1985). Technically, of course, many groups, including the Church of 
Scientology and the Unification Church, were founded before the 1960s, and thus would 
claim that they are anything but “new.” See id. Practically speaking, within a culture where one 
or two churches have historically and traditionally dominated the religious landscape, a new 
religious movement generally includes religious groups that enjoy a minority status both his-
torically and, most certainly, politically. For a discussion of the definition of new religious 
movements, see id. at 12-17. 
 2. See, e.g., Sénat, Proposed Law No. 131, Dec. 14, 1999, “Proposition de loi tendant 
à renforcer le dispositif pénal à l’encontre des associations ou groupements constituant, par 
leurs agissements délictueux, un trouble à l’ordre public ou un péril majeur pour la personne 
humaine” [“A Law Proposal Aimed at Reinforcing the Criminal System Against Associations 
or Groups which Constitute, by their Criminal Schemes, a Threat to the Public Order or a Ma-
jor Danger to Human Dignity”] [hereinafter Senate Proposed Law] (visited Sept. 20, 2000) 
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French National Assembly unanimously approved a Proposed Law3 
(“Proposed Law”) designed to facilitate the dissolution of sectes4 
within France. In addition to creating a civil mechanism for the dis-
solution of religious entities, the Proposed Law, among other things, 
creates restrictions on the location of specified NRMs, prohibits the 
dissemination of information regarding NRMs, and criminalizes 
“mental manipulation.”5 Having passed the National Assembly, the 
 
<http://www.senat.fr/leg/tas99-52.html>; Assemblée Nationale, Report No. 1687, June 10, 
1999, “Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête sur la situation financière, patrimoni-
ale et fiscale des sectes, ainsi que sur leurs activités economiques et leurs relations avec les mi-
lieux économiques et financiers” [“Report by the Inquiry Commission on the Financial Situa-
tion of Sects, as well as their Economic Activities and their Relations with the Economic and 
Financial Realms”] [hereinafter Finances of Sects Report] (visited Sept. 20, 2000) 
<http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/2/2dossiers.html>; Assemblée Nationale, Report No. 
2468, Dec. 22, 1995, “Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête sur les sectes” [“Re-
port by the Inquiry Commission on Sects”] [hereinafter Sects in France Report] (visited Sept. 
20, 2000) <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/2/2dossiers.html>. 
 3. Assemblée Nationale, Proposed Law No. 2435, May 30, 2000, “Proposition de loi 
tendant à renforcer la prévention et la répression à l’encontre des groupements à caractère sec-
taire” [“A Law Proposal Aimed at Reinforcing the Prevention and the Repression Against 
Groups with a Sectarian Character”] [hereinafter Proposed Law] (visited Sept. 20, 2000) 
<http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/2/2dossiers.html>. 
 4. A clarification of terms is necessary. In English, the term “sect” generally refers neu-
trally to a branch or division within an established religious tradition. The term “cult” carries a 
universally pejorative connotation. See Discrimination on the Basis of Religion and Belief in 
Western Europe: Testimony Before the House Comm. on Int’l Relations, 106th Cong., at n.6 (vis-
ited July 7, 2000) <http://www.house.gov/international_relations/full/relminor/gunn. 
htm> (statement of Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn) [hereinafter Gunn Testimony]. Conversely, in 
French, culte carries a neutral meaning and denotes a recognized religious tradition. See id. at 
n.6. The French word secte can be interpreted in two very different ways. Books by sociologists 
of the late 19th and early 20th centuries use the word secte with no derogatory meaning to re-
fer to small denominations or groups that are not yet regarded as mainstream churches. See 
Religious Liberty in Western Europe: Deterioration of Religious Liberty in Europe Briefing Before 
the Comm’n on Sec. and Cooperation in Europe of the United States Congress, 105th Cong. 
(1998) (statement of Dr. Massimo Introvigne, Managing Director, Center for Studies of New 
Religions (“CESNUR”)) [hereinafter 1998 Introvigne Statement]. Today, when used by fran-
cophone governments, secte reflects a pejorative label for minority groups, usually of a spiritual, 
religious, or philosophical nature. See Gunn Testimony, supra. Notwithstanding this usage, 
there is no formal legal or technical definition of the term secte. See Prelot, supra note 1, at 
159. But see discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the French government’s de facto definition 
of a secte). For the reasons discussed supra note 1, this Comment will refer to groups that the 
French government labels as sectes as new religious movements or “NRMs.” 
 5. “Mental manipulation,” as defined within the text of the law, is synonymous with 
brainwashing. See Proposed Law, supra note 3, art. 10 (defining mental manipulation as “ac-
tivities which have the purpose or effect to create or exploit the psychological or physical de-
pendence of those who participate and, . . . to exert on a person serious and repeated pressure 
to create or exploit such a state of dependence and to lead the person, against his will or not, 
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Proposed Law will be introduced into the Senate in the coming 
months. 
The Proposed Law is France’s latest major attempt to restrict 
religious liberties for members of minority religious faiths.6 However, 
both the Proposed Law and other recent actions by the French gov-
ernment targeting NRMs violate international and European cove-
nants upholding religious freedom.7 It is unsettling that these dis-
criminatory actions should emanate from France. An influential 
Western European country with a tradition of respecting human 
rights,8 France is home to many international human rights organiza-
tions, including the European Court of Human Rights in Stras-
bourg. In addition to the discriminatory effects that these restrictive 
measures have on members of NRMs within France, the possible 
precedential effects of France’s actions on its European neighbors, 
especially the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe, warrants con-
cern. 
This Comment argues that the Proposed Law and other meas-
ures taken by the French government violate the religious liberty 
protections enshrined in numerous international instruments and 
pan-European court decisions; the French government should there-
fore reject the Proposed Law and alter its other anti-sect actions so as 
to provide minority religious faiths with greater protections. In Part 
II, this Comment surveys the historical, cultural, and political pres-
sures behind France’s anti-sect policy as well as the specific provisions 
of the Proposed Law. Part III details France’s international and 
European commitments to uphold religious liberty and how recent 
French anti-sect measures and the Proposed Law violate these gov-
 
to an act or to abstention from an act which is heavily detrimental to that person”) (translation 
by author). 
 6. For a chronology of France’s recent attempts to restrict the religious liberties of 
NRMs in France, see discussion infra Part II.B-C. 
 7. For an analysis of the validity of the Proposed Law under international and Euro-
pean conventions, see discussion infra Part III.B. 
 8. See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FRANCE COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 
1996 (1997) (stating that the French government has respected in practice the law of separa-
tion of church and state and generally respected human rights) [hereinafter FRANCE COUNTRY 
REPORT 1996]. But cf. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FRANCE COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 
1998 (1999) (documenting the rise in human rights violations with regard to religious liberties 
and chronicling the government’s anti-sect initiatives) [hereinafter FRANCE COUNTRY REPORT 
1998]; see also infra note 58 (noting a history of prejudice against Muslims in France). 
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erning international and European instruments. Finally, Part IV ana-
lyzes the interplay between France’s actions and Europe’s response: 
recommendations by pan-European institutions (the European Par-
liament and the Council of Europe) and multiple rulings by pan-
European courts that uphold religious liberty for NRMs. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A survey of the history of religious liberty in France is a prerequi-
site to understanding the National Assembly’s Proposed Law and the 
current cultural and political milieu of anti-sect sentiment. Part II.A 
presents a brief history of church-state relations in France,9 roughly 
divided into five periods: (1) pre-Revolutionary France: 1562-1789; 
(2) the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen: 1789-1799; (3) Emperor Napolean Bonaparte’s 
Concordat with Pope Pius VII: 1799-1804; (4) Republican anti-
cléricalisme10 and the Law of 1905: 1875-1940; and (5) the modern 
approach to laïcité11 as embodied in the 1958 Constitution: 1940-
 
 9. For this historical synopsis, I have relied upon information presented in RELIGION 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS 5 (Tad Stahnke & J. Paul Martin eds., 1998) 
[hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS]; Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet, State and Church in France, 
in STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 119, 120-22 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 
1996); and Rik Torfs, Church and State in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands: Unexpected 
Similarities and Hidden Differences, 1996 BYU L. REV. 945, 947-48. 
 10. With its origins in the Enlightenment, anticléricalisme emerged as a movement dur-
ing the middle of the 19th century in many Catholic nations; France was the center of the an-
ticlerical movement. See GINO RAYMOND, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF FRANCE 23 (1998); J. 
SALWYN SCHAPIRO, ANTICLERICALISM: CONFLICT BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE IN 
FRANCE, ITALY, AND SPAIN 32, 34 (Louis L. Snyder ed., 1967). A movement directed against 
the Catholic Church, anticléricalisme was the counterpart to cléricalisme, a position taken by 
the Catholic Church wherein the Church could “interven[e] . . . in the formulation and direc-
tion of public policies through the exercise of special powers conferred on its clergy by the 
state. These special powers rested on three pillars: union of Church and state; Church control 
of education; and Church control of family relations.” Id. at 25. The anticlerical ideology cen-
tered on the basic tenet of secularism, and the anticlerical agenda, therefore, included the sepa-
ration of church and state, the secularization of public education, and the secularization of 
marital union (i.e., creating a civil marriage alternative to religious marriage). See id. at 32-33. 
 11. Translated literally from the French, laïcité means “secularism.” See Torfs, supra 
note 9, at 950 n.16. Others have translated laïcité to mean the French idea of “secular human-
ism,” which embodies a set of political, philosophical, and, often, antireligious principles. See 
1998 Introvigne Statement, supra note 4. In a more benign translation, laïcité has been defined 
to encapsulate the concept of separation of church and state: “in all acceptable definitions 
[laïcité] includes the separation of spiritual matters from the competence of the state . . . .” 
and “an affirmation of the sovereign authority of the state in its domain of the temporal or-
der.” WILLIAM BOSWORTH, CATHOLICISM AND CRISIS IN MODERN FRANCE 40 (1962). This 
definition of laïcité “resembles the philosophy of relations between equal states in the interna-
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present. Part II.B sets forth France’s current religious demography 
and chronologically details France’s recent actions limiting religious 
liberty. Part II.C surveys the provisions of France’s most recent anti-
sect endeavor, the Proposed Law. 
A. A Brief History of Church-State Relations in France 
1. Pre-Revolutionary France: 1562-1789 
Prior to the French Revolution of 1789, the French government 
and the Catholic Church were intricately enmeshed entities that re-
lied heavily upon each other for their authority.12 Because the Catho-
lic Church was the only legally recognized faith,13 religious freedoms 
for other religious groups were granted and revoked at will by the 
State.14 At the end of the period known as the Religious Wars (1562-
1598), Henry IV issued the Edict of Nantes, granting to Calvinists 
certain civil liberties and the right to worship in designated places.15 
These liberties were short-lived, however; Louis XIV revoked the 
Edict of Nantes in 1685.16 In addition, Louis XIV ordered the de-
struction of all Calvinist temples and punished with penal servitude 
those Calvinists who attempted to flee the country.17 
Approximately 100 years later, the reformist government of 
Louis XVI promulgated the “Edict of Toleration” in 1787, which 
returned most individual civil rights to Calvinists.18 Nonetheless,  
 
 
tional realm: complete freedom of each in its own realm and noninterference in the internal 
affairs of the other.” Id. at 41. 
 12. See SCHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 17-18. 
 13. See id. at 17. 
 14. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 5. 
 15. See id.; see also NORMAN RAVITCH, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE FRENCH 
NATION 1589-1989, at 9, 22-25 (1990) (describing the Edict of Nantes as “more a unique 
interim solution to the problem of religious diversity than a true policy of toleration” and dis-
cussing the religious liberties for Protestants that attended the Edict of Nantes). 
 16. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 5; see also RAVITCH, supra note 15, at 25-
27 (outlining the foreign and domestic policy rationales behind the revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes). 
 17. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 5. 
 18. See id.; see also RAVITCH, supra note 15, at 28, 36 (enumerating the privileges 
granted to Protestants under the “Edict of Toleration” as including the rights to live in France 
and practice a profession, to contract marriage legally before a magistrate, to have their births 
registered before a judge, and to receive dignified burial). 
HSMI-FIN.DOC 10/12/00  3:14 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1104 
Calvinists were still denied the freedom to worship in public and to 
organize as a religious group until the French Revolution.19 
2. The French Revolution: 1789-1799 
The second period of modern significance centers on the French 
Revolution of 1789, which sought to dismantle the Old Regime and 
along with it the control of the Catholic Church in matters of public 
life.20 The French Revolution, even during the more moderate 
phases, 
deprived the Catholic Church of the tithe, nationalized its prop-
erty, and ended its corporate independence, unilaterally redrew ec-
clesiastical boundaries, all but abolished the regular clergy, de-
moted the secular clergy to the status of elected and salaried state 
servants, and persecuted clergymen who refused to swear loyalty to 
these and other peremptorily imposed “reforms.”21 
Through these and other more drastic means, the revolutionary 
republicans sought to eradicate the influence of the Catholic Church 
from civil society.22 At the same time that revolutionaries persecuted 
the Catholic Church, the French government granted full civil and 
political rights to Protestants and Jews.23 
The republican revolutionaries’ antipathy towards the Catholic 
establishment was transparent in the two primary documents of this 
period—the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
(“Declaration of the Rights of Man”)24 and the Constitution of 
 
 19. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 5. 
 20. See SCHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 21. 
 21. DALE K. VAN KLEY, THE RELIGIOUS ORIGINS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: 
FROM CALVIN TO THE CIVIL CONSTITUTION, 1560-1791, at 1 (1996). Van Kley notes that 
during the more severe phases of the Revolution, Catholic clergy were massacred, and 
churches were converted into “Temples of Reason.” See id. 
 22. See RAYMOND, supra note 10, at 23. 
 23. See ALAN PALMER, AN ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF NAPOLEON’S EUROPE (1984); 
SCHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 21. Prior to the French Revolution, the government granted 
Protestants limited civil rights in the Edict of Toleration. See supra note 18 and accompanying 
text. 
 24. LA DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN DE 1789, at art. X 
[THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN OF 1789] (Fr.), reprinted 
in C. ADM. 18 (Fr.) (23rd ed. 1994) [hereinafter DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN]. See 
generally P. Dawson, Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, in 1 HISTORICAL 
DICTIONARY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1789-1799, at 301, 301-04 (Samuel F. Scott & 
Barry Rothaus eds., 1985) [hereinafter HISTORICAL DICTIONARY]. 
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1791.25 Both guaranteed religious liberties. The Declaration of the 
Rights of Man secured freedom of belief,26 and the Constitution of 
1791 provided for freedom of religious observance.27 
3. The Concordat of 1801: 1799-1804 
The third period commenced with Emperor Napolean Bona-
parte’s negotiation of the Concordat of 1801 with Pope Pius VII.28 
This Concordat reestablished peace between the Catholic Church 
and the French government by guaranteeing the public practice of 
religion and reestablishing public financial support of parish priests.29 
The Concordat was supplemented by the Seventy-Seven Organic Ar-
ticles—a unilateral act of the French government never recognized 
by the Catholic Church—which allowed civil authorities to exercise 
significant control over ministers of religion and religious life.30 
 
 
 25. CONST. de 1791 [Constitution of 1791] (Fr.). For discussions of the Constitution 
of 1791, see Dawson, supra note 24, at 236-38; FRANCE: A COMPANION TO FRENCH 
STUDIES 130 (D.G. Charlton ed., 2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter FRENCH STUDIES]; and PALMER, 
supra note 23, at 94. 
 26. See DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN, supra note 24, at art. X (“No-one may 
be troubled due to his opinions, whether or not they are on religious issues[,] provided that 
the expression of these opinions does not disturb the peace.”) (translation by the French Min-
istry of Justice <http://www.justice.gouv.fr/anglais/addhc.htm>). 
 27. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 9, at 120. 
 28. Concordat de 1801 [Concordat of 1801] (Fr.), reprinted in SCHAPIRO, supra note 
10, at 121-24 [hereinafter Concordat of 1801]. See also FRENCH STUDIES, supra note 25, at 
278; JOHN MCMANNERS, CHURCH AND STATE IN FRANCE, 1870-1914, at 4-12 (1972) 
(quoting the Concordat, which referred to Catholicism as “the religion of the great majority of 
French citizens” and stating that both the Church and the French government had an interest 
in making the agreement work); PALMER, supra note 23, at 91; RAYMOND, supra note 10, at 
23; SCHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 22-23. See generally HENRY H. WALSH, THE CONCORDAT 
OF 1801: A STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALISM IN THE RELATIONS OF CHURCH AND 
STATE (1967) (exploring the influence that nationalism had on the French statesmen who ne-
gotiated the Concordat). 
 29. See Concordat of 1801, reprinted in SCHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 121-24. At least 
one scholar has noted that the Concordat retained ambiguities with respect to church-state 
relations. For example, using ambiguous language, Article 1 guaranteed the public practice of 
religion “in accordance with such regulations as the Government deems necessary for the pub-
lic peace.” Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 9, at 121 & n.2 (quoting Concordat of 1801). 
 30. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 9, at 121. 
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4. Anticléricalisme and the Third Republic: 1875-1940 
Laws promulgated during the Third Republic31 (1875-1940) are 
perhaps the most significant in understanding contemporary French 
notions of secularism. During the early years of the Third Republic, 
the goals of anticléricalisme32 were achieved;33 a series of laws were 
passed that significantly reduced the Catholic Church’s influence in 
public life, especially in education.34 In 1881, 1882, and 1886, the 
government passed legislation that provided for a universal system of 
primary education that was secular, public, free, and completely de-
void of the Catholic Church’s influence.35 The most extreme exam-
ple of anticlerical dominance in education took place in 1902, when 
more than 3,000 Catholic educational institutions were shut down.36 
The triumph of anticléricalisme eventually led France to officially 
break diplomatic ties with the Papacy in Rome in 1904.37 Finally, the 
Law of 190538 officially implemented the separation of church and 
state39 and formalized republican notions of laïcité.40 While Article 1 
 
 31. See RAYMOND, supra note 10, at 231-32. 
 32. See supra note 10 (defining anticléricalisme). 
 33. See RAYMOND, supra note 10, at 23. See, e.g., ROBERT GILDEA, THE PAST IN 
FRENCH HISTORY 214-17 (1994); JUDITH F. STONE, THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL PEACE: 
REFORM LEGISLATION IN FRANCE, 1890-1914, at 77 (1985); 1 THEODORE ZELDIN, FRANCE 
1848-1945, at 683-98 (1973). 
 34. See RAYMOND, supra note 10, at 23; see also MCMANNERS, supra note 28, at 45-54 
(explaining that the Republicans actively pursued a “policy of ‘laicization’ of education [as] an 
insurance for the future of the Republic,” meaning that the Republicans feared that so long as 
the Church maintained significant control of French schools, Republican notions of secularism 
would not be indoctrinated in future generations). 
 35. See RAYMOND, supra note 10, at 23. 
 36. See id. at 23, 66-67. For a further discussion of the anticlerical governments of Wal-
deck-Rousseau (1899-1902) and Combes (1902-1905), see MALCOLM O. PARTIN, 
WALDECK-ROUSSEAU, COMBES, AND THE CHURCH: THE POLITICS OF ANTICLERICISM, 
1899-1905 (1969). See also MCMANNERS, supra note 28, at 118-39 (discussing the anticlerical 
government policies of Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes); RAYMOND, supra note 10, at 66-67, 
277 (briefly describing the anticlerical governments of Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes). 
 37. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 9, at 122. 
 38. Loi du 9 décembre 1905 [Law of Dec. 9, 1905] reprinted in C. ADM. 787 (Fr.) 
(23rd ed. 1994) [hereinafter Law of 1905]. The Law of 1905 does not apply in three départe-
ments (“departments”) in eastern France, namely, Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin, and Moselle, which 
were under German rule during its promulgation. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 9, at 
122. When Germany eventually returned these departments to France in 1918, they retained 
the law as it existed prior to the 1905 promulgation. See id. For a brief discussion of the Law of 
1905, see JAMES J. COOKE, FRANCE 1789-1962, at 158 (1975). See infra note 82 (describing 
the function of départements in French local government). 
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of the Law of 1905 guaranteed freedom of conscience and public 
worship to all religions,41 Article 2 discontinued the recognition of 
any official church, any legal establishment of a religion, and any 
public financial assistance of religion.42 The combination of these 
two articles resulted in official government neutrality towards relig-
ion,43 which remains the regime in France today.44 
Moreover, the Law of 1905, in conjunction with the Law of 
1901,45 is the most significant statute in the French legal framework 
whereby religious organizations may register for legal status and state 
benefits.46 The Law of 1905 established the status of association cul-
 
 39. See Law of 1905, supra note 38, arts. 1 & 2. For the full text of these articles, see 
infra notes 41 & 42. 
 40. See supra note 11 (defining laïcité). 
 41. See Law of 1905, supra note 38, art. 1 (“The Republic ensures freedom of con-
science. It guarantees the free exercise of religion subject to the sole restrictions established in 
the interest of public policy.”) (translation by the French Ministry of Justice <http://www. 
justice.gouv.fr/anglais/acure.htm>). 
 42. See id. art. 2 (“The Republic does not recognize, remunerate, or subsidize any relig-
ion. In consequence, starting on the 1st of January which follows the publication of this Law, 
all expenses concerning the practice of religions shall be abolished from the budgets of the 
State, departments, and townships. However, expenses concerning the services of the chaplain 
and destined to ensure the free practice of religion in public establishments such as high 
schools, hospices, asylums, and prisons, may be included in these budgets. The publicly formed 
or financed establishments of religion are abolished subject to the conditions stipulated in Arti-
cle 3.”) (translation by the French Ministry of Justice <http://www.justice.gouv.fr/anglais/ 
acure.htm>). 
 43. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 9, at 122. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Loi du 1er juillet 1901 [Law of July 1, 1901] reprinted in C. ADM. 695 (Fr.) (23rd 
ed. 1994) [hereinafter Law of 1901]. While the Law of 1905 permits registration for a reli-
gious group as an association cultuelle (“association of worship”), the Law of 1901 permits reg-
istration as an association culturelle (“cultural association” or “non-profit association”) for both 
religious and non-religious groups. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: FRANCE (Sept. 5, 2000) [hereinafter FRANCE COUNTRY REPORT 
2000]. An association of worship must only engage in liturgical practices, while a cultural asso-
ciation may engage in a broad array of activities that advance the culture of a certain group. See 
id. 
 46. Recognition as a worship association under the Law of 1905 translates into signifi-
cant benefits from the state, including tax exemptions from donations. See id. Registration 
solely under the Law of 1901 does not afford these same benefits. See id. Because few denomi-
nations are officially recognized by the Ministry of the Interior as religious organizations under 
the Law of 1905, few are entitled to these exemptions: “According to statistics published in 
1993 by the Ministry of Interior, only 109 out of 1,138 Protestant associations, 15 out of 147 
Jewish associations, and two out of more than 1,000 Muslim associations are currently entitled 
to benefit from legacies and exemption on donations.” Deterioration of Religious Liberty in 
Europe Briefing Before the Comm’n on Sec. and Cooperation in Europe of the United States Con-
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tuelle or “association of worship,”47 under which groups with exclu-
sively religious purposes may be legally registered and recognized.48 
Organizations seeking registration as an association cultuelle under 
the Law of 1905 must satisfy its requirements and comply with the 
general provisions of the Law of 1901 governing all non-profit asso-
ciations.49  
While French legal principles ensure freedom of conscience and 
freedom of association generally, clauses within the above-mentioned 
laws limit these freedoms. For example, the Law of 1901 requires 
that associations must not have “an illicit purpose, contrary to law, 
and good morals”50 and, more generally, must not contravene the 
public order.51 Given these limitations, the status of association cul-
tuelle has been allocated sparingly and has regularly been denied to 
NRMs who seek registration under the Law of 1905.52 
5. Modern period: 1940-present 
Official government neutrality has characterized the fifth modern 
period (1940-present). While the official separation of church and 
state enacted by the Law of 1905 grew out of hostile anticlerical sen-
timent, contemporary notions of separation of church and state em-
phasize a more benign form of laïcité.53 Reinforcing the prior com-
mitment to freedom of religion, the modern Republic’s Constitution 
of 1958 contained two provisions protecting the same. The Pream-
 
gress, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Willy Fautré, Chairman, Human Rights Without 
Frontiers) [hereinafter 1998 Fautré Statement]. 
 47. See Law of 1905, supra note 38, art. 4 (providing for the formation of associations 
cultuelles). 
 48. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 9, at 124-25. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Law of 1901, supra note 45, art. 3. 
 51. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 9, at 128. 
 52. See id. at 128-29. It should be noted that the Catholic Church in France rejected 
the designation of association cultuelle “fear[ing] the emergence of a multitude of different 
associations, all claiming to be of the Catholic Church but which the hierarchy could not con-
trol and in which the laity would have the power of decision-making.” Basdevant-Gaudemet, 
supra note 9, at 125. Thus, the Catholic Church is governed by a completely separate set of 
laws. See id. 
 53. See id. at 123 (describing laïcité positive, which requires frequent state intervention 
to ensure the necessary practical conditions for all religious public worship). For a discussion of 
the tensions in the modern approach to French laïcité, see id. at 123 (explaining the difficulties 
that accompany the practical application of the principle laïcité positive) and Torfs, supra note 
9, at 950-55 (describing several different notions of modern French laïcité). 
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ble reaffirmed the Declaration of the Rights of Man,54 and Article 2 
pronounced that France “guarantees the equality of all citizens be-
fore the law, without regard to origin, race or religion. It respects all 
beliefs.”55 
B. The Religious, Cultural, and Political Milieu of France’s  
Anti-Sect Policy 
France has traditionally been a single-faith country with Roman 
Catholicism at the core of its religious past.56 Recent estimates place 
Roman Catholic membership at almost eighty percent of the French 
population, though less than fifteen percent of Catholics regularly 
attend Sunday Mass.57 The second largest religion in France is Islam, 
which claims almost four million adherents.58 Additionally, there are 
approximately 750,000 Protestants and 650,000 Jews.59 By contrast, 
 
 54. See CONST. DE 1958 [Constitution of 1958] preamble (Fr.), translated in GEORGE 
A. BERMANN ET AL., FRENCH LAW: CONSTITUTION AND SELECTIVE LEGISLATION 2-9 
(Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University ed., 1998) [hereinafter 
Constitution of 1958] (“The French people hereby solemnly proclaim their attachment to the 
Rights of Man and the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, 
reaffirmed and complemented by the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946.”). 
 55. Id. art. 2, reprinted in Jean-Paul Durand, Droit civil ecclésiastique français en 1995-
1996, 3 EUR. J. FOR CHURCH & ST. RES. 41, 45 (1996) (“[La France] assure l’égalité devant 
la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respecte toutes 
les croyances.”). 
 56. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 9, at 119 (noting that while “France is a coun-
try in the Catholic tradition,” religious observance is “less wide-spread” today than it once 
was). 
 57. See id. at 119 n.1. The French government does not keep statistics on religious af-
filiation. 
 58. See id. It should be noted that the Muslim population in France has faced significant 
prejudice due to religious and cultural differences. The Council of Europe’s European Com-
mission against Racism and Intolerance (“ECRI”) recently reported that “[p]rejudice against 
Muslim communities (Islamophobia) is a disturbing trend, manifested in violence, harassment, 
discrimination, and general negative attitudes and stereotypes.” Annual Report on ECRI’s Ac-
tivities Covering the Period from 1 January to 31 December 1999, Eur. Comm’n Against Racism 
& Intolerance (April 27, 2000). Intolerance towards Muslims has manifested itself in France 
particularly with regard to employment discrimination, accommodating Muslim religious prac-
tices at school and work, discrimination against Muslim girls wearing headscarves at school, 
and the inability to obtain legal recognition for religious purposes. See Gunn Testimony, supra 
note 4, at n.7 and accompanying text; see also FRANCE COUNTRY REPORT 1996, supra note 8, 
Part 2.c. 
 59. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 9, at 119. Just as Muslims have experienced 
religious intolerance in France, so too has anti-Semitism afflicted French Jews. The most 
prominent example of anti-Semitism in French history is the Dreyfus affair. See 2 ADRIEN 
DANSETTE, RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF MODERN FRANCE 166-84 (1961) (discussing the impact 
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NRMs in France—those of native and foreign origin60—claim far 
fewer members.61 Those NRMs with the largest presence in France 
include the Jehovah’s Witnesses (approximately 130,000 members)62 
and the Church of Scientology (approximately 10,000 members).63 
Most NRMs, however, claim fewer than 10,000 adherents each.64 
Even though NRMs’ membership rosters are negligible com-
pared to those of traditional religions, the rise of NRMs in France 
has been met with opposition and hostility, stemming from certain 
cultural factors.65 The French government’s monitoring of NRMs 
 
of the Dreyfus Affair upon the religious climate in France during 1898-99). But cf. FRANCE 
COUNTRY REPORT 1996, supra note 8, § 2.c (reporting that the highest French administrative 
court ruled that Jewish students could be excused from attending classes on the Jewish Sab-
bath). 
 60. For listings of NRMs of both origins, see Prelot, supra note 1, Annexes 1 & 2. It is 
interesting to note that some of the French government’s rhetoric regarding NRMs has fo-
cused on their foreign status. However, as Prelot’s list illustrates, many NRMs in France are 
not foreign at all but have their origins in French-speaking European countries. See, e.g., Pre-
lot, supra note 1, at 169-72 (listing, among others, the Geneva-based Ordre du Temple Solaire 
or “Order of the Solar Temple”). While several of the more high-profile NRMs in France 
originated in foreign countries, NRMs are no more uniform in origin than they are in belief or 
practice. 
 61. The French police estimate that there are some 250 NRMs in France with 160,000 
members and approximately 100,000 “sympathizers.” Gail Russell Chaddock, With New Zeal, 
France Screens Religious “Sects”, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 18, 1996, at 1. 
 62. See Sects in France Report, supra note 2, at Part I.B.1 (listing Jehovah’s Witnesses as 
the largest NRM in France with 130,000 members). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Willy Fautré, the Chairman of Human Rights Without Frontiers, has suggested that 
several factors foster adverse government policies towards NRMs, including: (1) a historical 
monopoly of one or two dominant religions within a country; (2) an increasing secularism in 
society; (3) the regression of established religions; and (4) the agitation of private-sector anti-
sect groups. See Willy Fautré, Human Rights Without Frontiers, (last modified Oct. 19, 1999) 
<http://www. hrwf.net>. 
  Many of these factors pertain in varying degrees to French society. First, as discussed 
supra Part II.A-B, France is a nation in the Catholic tradition, and, while the modern practice 
of the Catholic faith has decreased, French religious culture and tradition is still very much tied 
to Catholicism. Second, since the French Revolution and the triumph of anticléricalisme dur-
ing the Third Republic, secularism in France has been on the rise. The rise of secularism is re-
inforced when one considers the third point: the decline of religiosity and regression of estab-
lished religions in France is well documented. Norman Ravitch noted that in the years 
following the Second Vatican Council in 1965 the Catholic Church in France has “seen a strik-
ing decline of religious practice,” “a crisis in vocations,” “the decline of the parish as the center 
of Catholic activity,” and has, in short, “lost its unity.” RAVITCH, supra note 15, at 153-65. 
Finally, the influence of anti-sect organizations, such as the UNADFI and the CCMM, see in-
fra notes 68 & 69 and accompanying text, on the French government relating to its measures 
against NRMs is pervasive. See, e.g., Debats du Sénat [Senate Debates] No. 40, Dec. 16, 1999, 
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at para. 36 (statement of Mme. Derycke) (honoring members of the UNADFI and the 
CCMM as “the two principal associations that fight against sectes” during the course of Senate 
debates concerning the passage of the 1999 Senate bill aimed at dissolving NRMs); Observa-
toire inter-ministérial sur les sectes [Inter-ministerial Observatory on Sects], Rapport annuel 
1997 [1997 Annual Report] [hereinafter Observatory on Sects 1997 Annual Report] (visited 
on Oct. 29, 1999) <http://www.cesnur.org/testi/OBSERV.htm> (specifically attributing 
one of the Observatory’s proposals to advocacy by the CCMM). 
  U.S. Congressman Christopher H. Smith, Chairman of the Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, has concluded, based on testimony of expert witnesses before the 
Commission, that two specifically French factors tend towards religious intolerance. See Reli-
gious Freedom in Western Europe: Religious Minorities and Growing Government Intolerance 
Hearings Before the Comm’n on Sec. and Cooperation in Europe of the United States Congress, 
106th Cong. (June 8, 1999) (statement of Representative Christopher H. Smith). The first 
French-specific factor is the anti-sect and anti-religious lobbying efforts of continental Freema-
sonry, a secular-humanist strand of Freemasonry that is unconnected to the mainstream United 
States and British Lodges. Freemasonry spread to the Continent from London in the 18th cen-
tury and became associated with deism and the rationalistic ideas of the Encylcopaedists. See 
PALMER, supra note 23. As early as 1738, the hostility of French Freemasons towards the 
Catholic Church led to papal condemnation. The French Revolution later embraced Freema-
sonry. Continental Freemasonry rejects the influence of the Catholic Church specifically, and 
religion generally, in favor of rationalistic discourse. 
  The second French-specific factor is a strong residual presence in French-speaking 
cultures of socialist and communist movements, which tend to be both anti-religious and anti-
American. As evidence of this, it should be noted that the Assembly’s Socialist party members 
as a group presented the Proposed Law before the Assembly for a vote, and the Senate bill that 
passed in December 1999 was also largely forwarded by Socialist Senators.  
  The anti-religious tendency of socialist and communist movements not only affects 
NRMs but all religious traditions, including majority faiths. Notably, leaders of majority faiths 
have in recent months expressed concern over France’s restrictive measures. During his formal 
acceptance of the new French ambassador to the Holy See, Pope John Paul II stated: 
To discriminate religious beliefs, or to discredit one or another form of religious 
practice is a form of exclusion contrary to the respect of fundamental human values 
and will eventually destabilise [sic] society, where a certain pluralism of thought and 
action should exist, as well as a benevolent and brotherly attitude. This will necessar-
ily create a climate of tension, intolerance, opposition and suspect, not conducive to 
social peace. 
Pope John Paul II, Speech at the Formal Acceptance of the New French Ambassador, Mr. 
Alain Dejammet, to the Holy See (June 10, 2000) (visited July 13, 2000) <http://www. 
cesnur.org/testi/fr2K_june1.htm> (translation by CESNUR). 
  Finally, anti-American sentiment by French officials has been highly public. Mr. 
Alain Vivien, President of MILS, has openly attacked American efforts to ensure the religious 
liberties of NRMs. In one such statement, he claimed that American efforts are motivated by 
“nefarious interests” and based on American notions of religious liberty embodied in the First 
Amendment that are wholly inapplicable to France: 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution of 1791 prohibits legisla-
tors from making laws on proselytization [sic]—while this should be the very field leg-
islators should regulate! The fathers of the French Constitution adopted a different 
attitude in 1789 when they included in the Constitution, under Article 4 of the 
1789 Declaration of Human Rights, that ‘Freedom consists in doing what does not 
cause damage to another (. . .) and limits may only be determined by law.’ . . . That 
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began as early as 1981 with the Senate Law Commission’s “Informa-
tion Mission on Sects” and was later followed by the 1985 Vivien 
Report.66 These reports, however, went largely unnoticed until anti-
sect sentiment resurged in the wake of the suicide-homicide of 
members of the Geneva-based Ordre du Temple Solaire in Switzer-
land and Canada in 1994, followed by similar events in southeastern 
France in 1995.67 
What followed was a coordinated response from the French gov-
ernment and at least two private anti-sect organizations: the National 
Union of Associations in Defense of the Family and the Individual 
(“UNADFI”)68 and the Center Against Mental Manipulation 
 
[Americans] may have revised the First Amendment is understandable because the 
first pioneers, who were persecuted in Europe for religious reasons, had the idea of 
securing religious peace. But today, vast and often very nefarious interests hide 
themselves behind an allegedly religious cultism. In this, we have a good fight to 
pick up with our U.S. friends! 
Claudine Castelnau, Une liberté sous contrôle, RÉFORME, Nov. 19, 1998, at 7 (translation by 
CESNUR) (emphasis added). See also Sectes: la France épinglée par les USA au nom de la liberté 
religieuse, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 14, 1999 (quoting Vivien who called religious liber-
ties in the United States “crazy”). Vivien’s attack ignores the fact that U.S. State Department 
officials utilize international treaties and European conventions to which France has commit-
ted, not the First Amendment, in their efforts to secure religious liberties for NRMs. 
  The anti-American sentiment among socialist and communist movements in France 
has resulted in systematic resistance to and prejudiced attacks of American officials. In one 
well-documented incident, a French official refused to meet with the State Department delega-
tion because, as the French official stated, a member of the delegation was a Scientologist. See 
Gunn Testimony, supra note 4. While the French official finally consented, he refused to speak 
to the delegation member at the meeting. See id. The French official’s facts were inaccurate; 
the delegation member was not a Scientologist. See id. Notwithstanding this inaccuracy, it is 
clear that such prejudiced actions are not below the tactics of some French officials, and that 
these tactics create an atmosphere of intolerance and reluctance to defend those who have been 
black-listed for fear that one will be seen as a “sympathizer.” See id. As a consequence, discus-
sions regarding religious liberty have been removed from the official State Department agenda 
with France, a status that France shares with only one other country—China. See Dr. T. Jeremy 
Gunn, Remarks at the Capitol Hill Briefing Sponsored by The Institute on Religion and Public 
Policy (July 13, 2000). 
 66. For a discussion of the 1985 Vivien Report, see Alain Garay, French Policy Against 
Sects 5 (Jan. 25, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing the 1985 
Vivien Report, entitled “Sects in France: Expression of Moral Freedom or Causes of Manipula-
tion,” as recommending increased surveillance of sectes). 
 67. See Chaddock, supra note 61, at 1; France Gets List of Sect Members Liable to Com-
mit Suicide, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 2, 1996; French Judge Concludes Order of Solar 
Temple Investigation, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 1, 1999; Police Meet over Solar Temple 
Deaths, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 27, 1995; Police Probe Other Sects over Death Cult, 
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 29, 1995; Ritual Suicide or Mass Murder in France?, THE 
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Feb. 7, 1996, at 126(1). 
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(“CCMM”).69 The French government, in coordination with these 
organizations, has advanced numerous proposals restricting NRMs in 
France.70 On June 29, 1995, the French National Assembly estab-
lished a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission, also known as the Gest 
(or Guyard) Commission (after the chairman or rapporteur, respec-
tively).71 The Commission was charged with “studying the sect phe-
nomenon” and with “proposing, if necessary, the adaptation of exist-
ing laws.”72 While finding that a legal definition of sectes was elusive, 
the Commission’s January 1996 Sects in France Report listed several 
factors indicating a group’s sectarian character: “mental destabiliza-
tion; exorbitant financial demands; induced rupture between adher-
 
 68. UNADFI derives from the French: Union nationale des associations de défense de la 
famille et de l’individu. For a general discussion of the UNADFI, see BECKFORD, supra note 
1, at 268-69. For a description of the organization’s mission, see the UNADFI’s web site at 
<http://pages.infinit.net/unadfi> (visited Oct. 19, 1999). 
 69. CCMM derives from the French: Centre contre les manipulations mentales. The 
UNADFI and the CCMM are both private anti-sect organizations with strong alliances in the 
French government. See BECKFORD, supra note 1, at 268-69. While the UNADFI at one time 
was critical of the French government for ignoring the alleged dangers presented by sectes, its 
relationship with the French government warmed significantly in 1979 when the Parliament 
agreed to conduct its first enquiry into NRMs in France. See BECKFORD, supra note 1, at 269. 
Since that time, the French government has relied on both organizations to provide informa-
tion and guidance in its policy against NRMs. The UNADFI and the CCMM were influential 
in identifying NRMs for the Gest Commission 1996 black-list, and both continue to play an 
important role in monitoring NRM activity, albeit unofficially, for the French government. See 
ALAIN GARAY, L’ACTIVISME ANTI-SECTES DE L’ASSISTANCE À L’AMALGAME 13-34 (1999) (de-
tailing French anti-sect associations’ activism against NRMs); Alain Garay, Réflexions sur les 
lobbies associatifs: le cas des associations dites anti-sectes, GAZETTE DU PALAIS, Apr. 28-30, 1996, 
at 2 (discussing the lobbying efforts of French anti-sect organizations). Finally, both organiza-
tions, which enjoy state-approved status as utilités publiques, gained legal standing as real par-
ties in interest when an amended version of a National Assembly private bill became law in 
June 2000; given this new law, both organizations would have legal standing to bring suit 
against NRMs under the Proposed Law. See FRANCE COUNTRY REPORT 2000, supra note 45; 
see also infra text accompanying notes 80 (listing the recommendation of legal standing for 
anti-sect associations as emanating from the Observatory on Sect’s 1997 Annual Report) & 
117 (quoting the text of the Proposed Law that references prior passage of the legal standing 
provision). 
 70. See supra notes 2 & 3 (listing various legislative measures). 
 71. See Sects in France Report, supra note 2, at Introduction (“[L]’Assemblée nationale 
a-t-elle, en adoptant à l’unanimité le 29 juin dernier la proposition de résolution présentée par 
M. Jacques Guyard et les membres socialiste, créé une commission d’enquête ‘chargée 
d’étudier le phénomène des sectes et de proposer, s’il y a lieu, l’adaptation des textes en 
vigeur.’” [“[T]he National Assembly, in unanimously adopting the June 29th proposed resolu-
tion presented by M. Jacques Guyard and the socialist members, created an inquiry commis-
sion, ‘charged with studying the sect phenomenon and proposing, if necessary, the adaptation 
of existing laws.’”]) (translation by author). 
 72. Id. 
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ents and their families; attacks on members; recruitment of children; 
anti-social discourse; disturbance of the public order; numerous legal 
battles; dishonest economic practices; and/or attempts to infiltrate 
organs of the State.”73 Using these factors, the Report black-listed 
172 NRMs deemed to be sectes, including Southern Baptists, Opus 
Dei, Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Church 
of Scientology.74 
To coordinate its NRM-monitoring activities, the Prime Minister 
in 1996 created an interministerial working group known as the 
“Observatory on Sects.”75 The Observatory’s 1997 Annual Report76 
recommended the following measures:77 (1) amend the law to give 
anti-sect organizations (like the UNADFI78 and the CCMM79) legal 
standing to initiate legal proceedings against NRMs;80 (2) modify the 
Law of 1901 regarding tax-exempt status for nonprofit associations 
by requiring heightened disclosures of monetary sources and finan-
cial management;81 (3) create a resource representative position in 
each of the ninety-five French departments82 to gather and relay in-
 
 73. Id. at Part I.A.2.d. (“la déstabilisation mentale; le caractère exorbitant des exigences 
financières; la rupture induite avec l’environnement d’origine; les atteintes à l’intégrité phy-
sique; l’embrigadement des enfants; le discours plus ou moins anti-social; les troubles à l’ordre 
public; l’importance des démêlés judiciaires; l’éventuel détournement des circuits économiques 
traditionnels; les tentatives d’infiltration des pouvoirs publics”). 
 74. See id. at Part I.B.1 (listing all 172 NRMs that qualified as sectes according to the 
Commission). For a critique of the Sects in France Report, see POUR EN FINIR AVEC LES 
SECTES: LE DÉBAT SUR LA RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION PARLEMENTAIRE (Massimo Introvigne 
& J. Gordon Melton eds., 1996). 
 75. See Observatory on Sects 1997 Annual Report, supra note 65. 
 76. While the Observatory’s 1997 Annual Report is not an official government docu-
ment because it lacks certain signatures, it has been published to the Internet by an anti-sect 
group and has been widely quoted in subsequent French government discourse on the topic. 
See 1998 Introvigne Statement, supra note 4. 
 77. See id. at Part III. 
 78. See supra notes 65, 68 & 69 (describing the UNADFI and the CCMM and their 
relationship to the French government’s fight against sectes). 
 79. See supra notes 65 & 69. 
 80. Since this recommendation was made, a private bill became law in June 2000 that 
allows these groups standing as a partie civile to bring suit against NRMs. See FRANCE 
COUNTRY REPORT 2000, supra note 45; see also supra note 69 & infra note 117. 
 81. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (describing the interrelationship be-
tween the Laws of 1901 and 1905 for the registration of religious entities). See also supra note 
65 (listing this proposal—one forwarded by the CCMM—as evidence of this anti-sect organi-
zation’s intimate involvement in French initiatives targeting NRMs). 
 82. Currently, continental France is subdivided into 96 départements (“departments”). 
See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (1999) (visited Oct. 19, 
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formation regarding NRMs to local governmental officials;83 (4) en-
act measures that would restrict NRM members’ entry into profes-
sional training programs; and (5) create a permanent commission at 
the European Union level to enhance cooperation among European 
nations.84 
In 1998, the “Observatory on Sects” was replaced by the “Inter-
ministerial Mission to Fight Against Sects” (“MILS”).85 MILS is 
presently headed by M. Alain Vivien, a socialist, former president of 
the anti-sect organization CCMM,86 former French foreign minister, 
and author of the 1985 Vivien Report.87 MILS was tasked with ana-
lyzing the sect phenomenon, informing the public of the danger of 
sectes, and coordinating all government meetings concerning the 
same.88 In late 1998, the French Minister of Justice issued a second 
circular89 urging state prosecutors to cooperate with MILS in bring-
ing more legal actions against sectes and encouraging local magis-
trates to form “institutional ties” with the UNADFI and the 
CCMM.90 At the same time, the National Assembly initiated a new 
 
1999) <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fr.html>. Four departments exist 
overseas in Guyana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion. RAYMOND, supra note 10, at 91. 
Départements are the main units of administration in France. See id. 
 83. Currently, each department in France, see supra note 82, has a “Mr. Cult” employed 
by the Ministry of Youth and Sport to make presentations to local cultural and sport organiza-
tions about the dangers of sectes. See 1998 Introvigne Statement, supra note 4. 
 84. See Observatory on Sects 1997 Annual Report, supra note 65, at Part III. 
 85. See Decree No. 98.890 of Oct. 7, 1998 (visited Oct. 29, 1999) <http://www. 
hrwf.net/English/france01.html> [hereinafter MILS decree]. MILS derives from the French: 
Mission Interministérielle de Lutte Contre les Sectes. See id. 
 86. See supra note 69 (describing CCMM). 
 87. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 88. See MILS decree, supra note 85. 
 89. The Ministry of Justice issued its first circulaire (“circular”) in 1996 immediately 
following the issuance of the Sects in France Report; it similarly encouraged local prosecutors 
to cooperate in bringing charges against NRMs. See Garay, supra note 66, at 7. The circular’s 
annex contained a copy of the black-listed 172 sectes as defined in the Sects in France Report. 
See id. See generally GARAY, supra note 69, at 77-81 (discussing the impact of 1996 circular). 
An administrative circulaire is usually deemed to have the status of a regulation if it contains 
directives to civil servants. See MARTIN WESTON, AN ENGLISH READER’S GUIDE TO THE 
FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 65 (1991). 
 90. See Circulaire contre les sectes du Ministre de la Justice français (visited Oct. 29, 
1999) <http://www.cesnur.org/testi/guigou.htm> (republishing the full text of the 1998 
circular). The Ministry of Justice’s second circular urged local magistrates to establish and 
“maintain institutional contact with ‘associations judged to be serious, such as the UNADFI 
and the CCMM, that combat sects. There can only be benefits from State prosecutors estab-
lishing ties with these associations, in order to discuss the schemes of cult movements that fall 
within their competence.’” Garay, supra note 66, at 12. 
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parliamentary inquiry commission to investigate the finances of 
NRMs, appointing two MILS members, Jacques Guyard91 and Jean-
Pierre Brard,92 as president and rapporteur respectively.93 The Com-
mission’s 1999 Finances of Sects Report detailed the finances of se-
lected NRMs and proposed various mechanisms to more closely 
scrutinize the financial management of NRMs.94 
The effect that these anti-sect initiatives has had on members of 
NRMs within France cannot be overstated. The effects include: har-
assment in the workplace,95 harassment at school,96 heightened inves-
tigations of religious organization’s financial management systems,97 
imposition of excessive taxes on donations to religious organiza-
 
 91. Mr. Guyard is a member of the French Socialist Party. See 1998 Fautré Statement, 
supra note 46. 
 92. Mr. Brard is a member of the French Communist Party. See id. 
 93. See Finances of Sects Report, supra note 2. 
 94. See id. See infra notes 97 & 98 and accompanying text (describing the increased 
scrutiny of religious organizations’ financial management and the taxation of donations against 
certain NRMs as a result of the recommendations of the Finances of Sects Report). 
 95. See Religious Freedom in Western Europe: Religious Minorities and Growing Govern-
ment Intolerance Hearing Before the Comm’n on Sec. and Cooperation in Europe of the United 
States Congress, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Willy Fautré, Chairman, Human Rights 
Without Frontiers) [hereinafter 1999 Fautré Statement]; Jehovah’s Witnesses in France: Deterio-
ration of Religious Liberty in Europe Briefing Before the Comm’n on Sec. and Cooperation in 
Europe of the United States Congress, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of James M. McCabe, 
Associate General Counsel, Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of Pennsylvania) [hereinafter 
1998 McCabe Statement]; Bruce Casino, Remarks at the Capitol Hill Briefing Sponsored by 
The Institute on Religion and Public Policy (July 13, 2000) (transcript on file with author) 
(detailing discrimination in the workplace against members of the Unification Church); Rev. 
Heber C. Jentzsch, Remarks at the Capitol Hill Briefing Sponsored by The Institute on Relig-
ion and Public Policy (July 13, 2000) (transcript on file with author) (detailing harassment of 
Scientologists in the workplace). 
 96. See 1998 Fautré Statement, supra note 46 (describing stigmatization of children at 
school). Apart from harassment because of one’s membership in an NRM, anti-sect fervor has 
reached French public school curriculum. See Anti-Cult Propaganda in French Public Schools, 
(visited Oct. 29, 1999) <http://www.cesnur.org/testi/feuillard.htm> (reprinting sections of 
DANY FEUILLARD ET AL., EDUCATION CIVIQUE (4th ed. 1998)) (translation by CESNUR). A 
fourth-grade civic education manual contains a section entitled the “Danger of Cults,” with 
subsections including the following: (1) Attracting and Luring, (2) Brainwashing Members, 
(3) The Guru, (4) Children in Cults, and (5) Cult Money. See id. at 18-19. Each section con-
tains a description of alleged secte activity with supporting testimonials from former members 
of various NRMs. See id. 
 97. See 1998 Fautré Statement, supra note 46; 1998 McCabe Statement, supra note 95 
(describing a parent-teacher organization meeting to discuss the fact that their child’s 
teacher—who had taught at the school for 18 years—was a member of a black-listed secte. The 
teacher was eventually transferred to another school). 
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tions,98 denial by local government leaders of rental facilities to hold 
meetings,99 denial by city officials to extend building permits for 
places of worship,100 and denial of child custody to a parent because 
of religion.101 Although the nature of these effects defies quantitative 
measurement, the anecdotal evidence is nonetheless chilling. 
 
 
 98. See 1998 Fautré Statement, supra note 46; 1998 McCabe Statement, supra note 95 
(describing an official audit of the Jehovah’s Witnesses by French tax authorities, which deter-
mined that the organization engaged in no commercial activity; nevertheless, French tax au-
thorities imposed a 60% tax on all donations received during the period from January 1, 1993, 
to August 31, 1996, a figure, after adding penalties and interest, which totaled in excess of 300 
million French francs or $50 million); see also Jehovah’s Witnesses in France Hit with 50 Million 
Dollar Tax Bill, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 29, 1998 (reporting that this was the first time 
the fiscal reform of 1992 on donations, infra, had been applied to a religious group). In June 
2000, the French Conseil d’État, see infra note 260, decided in the church’s favor, holding that 
the two congregations at issue could be recognized as religious organizations according to the 
Law of 1905 and therefore not subject to the application of the tax. See id. 
  While religious organizations are by law allowed exemptions to the tax on manual 
donations (dons manuels) (Loi des finances pour 1992), because the Ministry of the Interior re-
fuses to recognize most NRMs as religious organizations under the Law of 1905, most NRMs 
are subject to the tax. 
[T]he law on manual donations, or [the] transfer tax, is normally applied only to es-
tates or is comparable to what we have in the United States known as a gift tax. 
[T]he law simply provides that any deeds containing either a declaration by the 
donee or his representatives, or a judicial acknowledgement of a manual donation, 
are liable to the donation tax. Article 795 of the same law provides an exemption 
from the tax for donations and bequests made to religious corporations, unions or 
religious corporations and recognized congregations, and that’s where the problem 
comes in because the Ministry of Interior refuses to recognize the Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses and many of the other 172 listed organizations as religious, so the Ministry of 
Finance has determined the tax applies. 
1998 McCabe Statement, supra note 95. Even if an association is recognized as a religious or-
ganization under the Law of 1905, local administrative discretion often determines whether or 
not such organization will be subject to the tax. See FRANCE COUNTRY REPORT 2000, supra 
note 45. Local government officials may review a religious group’s status if tax authorities be-
come aware of a large gift to the organization. See id. If officials determine that the association 
is no longer in compliance with the Law of 1905, the religious organization’s status will be 
revoked and it will be subject to the 60% tax. See id. 
 99. See 1998 McCabe Statement, supra note 95 (describing the refusal by city officials in 
Lyon, France, to rent a facility to members of an NRM). 
 100. See id. (describing the denial of building permits for centers of religious worship for 
an NRM). 
 101. See id. (noting at least 11 cases where mothers were denied custody of their children 
in divorce proceedings because they were members of an NRM). 
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C. The National Assembly’s Proposed Law 
In May 2000, the French National Assembly’s Proposed Law102 
introduced into France’s arsenal potent legal weapons to fight 
NRMs.103 The preamble states the objectives of the Proposed Law: 
“[t]his bill intends to provide individuals and public authorities alike 
with new causes of action which will allow them to paralyze the ac-
tivities of cult organizations and render them harmless.”104 While 
many countries in the European Union have concluded that existing 
criminal sanctions suffice to punish dangerous conduct,105 France’s 
Proposed Law creates new causes of action designed to facilitate the 
dissolution of entire religious entities.106 In addition to creating a 
civil mechanism for dissolution, the Proposed Law severely restricts 
the physical establishment and proselytism of NRMs107 and creates a 
new cause of action for a suspect psychological theory: “mental ma-
nipulation.”108  
The Proposed Law would establish procedures whereby (1) a 
civil court may order the dissolution of an organization convicted 
 
 102. See Proposed Law, supra note 3. The author thanks the Church of Scientology for 
its Executive Summary of the Proposed Law’s provisions. See Bill Walsh, France: Discrimina-
tory and Repressive Legislation to Ban Targeted Religious Minorities (July 13, 2000) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author). 
 103. The 11 articles comprising the National Assembly’s Proposed Law derive from three 
previous legislative proposals, including the legislation introduced by Senator About and 
unanimously approved by the French Senate on December 16, 1999. See Senate Proposed 
Law, supra note 2. Senator About’s bill amended the Law of 1936, which permitted the disso-
lution of private militia groups and anti-government associations by presidential decree. See id. 
Senator About’s bill added NRMs to the list of groups that would be deemed against the pub-
lic order and thereby subject to dissolution by presidential decree. See id. The Assembly’s Pro-
posed Law has the same goal of dissolving NRMs but utilizes the judicial process rather than a 
political remedy. See id. If there is any redeeming value in the Assembly’s Proposed Law as 
compared to the Senate bill, it is that the dissolution procedure does not bypass normal legal 
and judicial procedures. 
 104. Proposed Law, supra note 3, preamble (“C’est pourquoi cette proposition de loi 
vise à apporter de nouveaux moyens d’agir pour les particuliers comme pour les pouvoirs pub-
lics, en vue de leur permettre de paralyser l’activité des organismes à caractère sectaire et de les 
mettre hors d’état de nuire.”). 
 105. See infra text accompanying notes 211, 221 & 222. 
 106. The notion that criminal law could be used to eradicate whole organizations based 
upon the individual actions of some of its members or officers contradicts fundamental princi-
ples of criminal law. These fundamental principles hold that criminal sanctions punish unlawful 
behavior rather than target entire institutions. 
 107. See Proposed Law, supra note 3, arts. 8 & 9. 
 108. Id. art. 10. See infra text accompanying note 129 (quoting the text of the Proposed 
Law that defines “mental manipulation”). 
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more than once of various enumerated offenses by a court of law; (2) 
a religious organization’s criminal liability would be increased when 
individual freedoms are jeopardized; (3) any attempts to reincorpo-
rate or recreate a religious entity that had been dissolved would be 
punished; (4) the establishment and proselytism of NRMs would be 
restricted so that minors, the elderly, and the ill would be protected 
from such groups; and (5) the act of “mental manipulation” would 
be punishable as a misdemeanor.109 The following sections discuss 
these specific provisions of the Proposed Law. 
1. Chapter I: Civil dissolution  
Chapter I, Article 1 provides a mechanism whereby any religious 
corporation pursuing activities “having the goal or effect to create or 
to exploit psychological or physical dependency of the individuals 
participating in its activities” may be dissolved by a civil court.110 The 
court of first instance will have discretion to order the dissolution of 
a religious corporation if two conditions are met: first, if more than 
one conviction111 has been entered against the corporation or its di-
rectors or officers112 for any of the criminal offenses113 enumerated in 
the bill;114 and second, if the corporation engages in activities that 
 
 109. See Proposed Law, supra note 3, preamble. 
 110. Id. art. 1. (“ayant pour but or pour effet de créer ou d’exploiter la dépendence psy-
chologique ou physique des personnes qui participent à ces activités . . . .”). 
 111. The text of Article 1 of the Proposed Law uses the phrase “plusieurs reprises,” 
which translated means “several times.” It is unclear from this text exactly when an NRM 
would become “eligible” for a dissolution action. At least one conviction is certainly required 
by the text; however, the term “several convictions” is vague. See id. 
 112. The text of the Proposed Law includes both de jure and de facto directors. See id. 
(“dirigeants de droit ou de fait”). Thus, a dissolution action could be brought against a group 
with no formal officers or directors when those individuals were nonetheless “leaders in fact” 
of an NRM and met the above-mentioned criteria. 
 113. The criminal offenses for which convictions may subject groups to dissolution in-
clude violations for: (1) false advertisement, fraud, and falsification according to French Con-
sumer Code articles L. 121-6 and L. 213-1 to L. 213-4; (2) illegal practice of medicine or ille-
gal pharmaceutical practice according to French Public Health Code articles L.376 and L.517; 
and (3) voluntary or involuntary harm done to the physical or psychological integrity of an 
individual; the endangerment of an individual; undermining the freedom of an individual; or 
taking advantage of minors, the elderly, or the ill, according to French Penal Code articles 
221-1 to 221-6, 222-1 to 222-40, 223-1 to 223-15, 224-1 to 224-4, 225-5 to 225-15, 225-
17 to 225-18, 226-1 to 226-23, 227-1 to 227-27, 311-1 to 311-13, 312-1 to 312-12, 313-1 
to 313-4, 314-1 to 314-4, and 324-1 to 324-6. See id. art. 1. 
 114. See Proposed Law, supra note 3, art. 1. At this point, the author would like to 
acknowledge that there are some individuals who use religion as a front for criminal conduct; 
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undermine the human rights or basic freedoms of individuals with 
the intent to exploit their physical or psychological well-being.115 
Procedurally, Article 1 allows a dissolution action to be initiated by a 
local prosecutor116 or at the request of any interested party117 and 
creates an expedited dissolution proceeding according to the French 
Code of Civil Procedure.118 
2. Chapter II: Extension of criminal liability to corporations  
 Chapter II, Articles 3 through 5 extend criminal liability to 
corporations that meet Article 1’s two dissolution conditions.119 One 
possible penalty is the permanent prohibition of the religious activity 
that gave rise to the criminal liability.120 Thus, in addition to organ-
izational dissolution, Chapter II provides a mechanism whereby spe-
cific minority religious activities may be permanently prohibited. 
3. Chapter III: Increased penalties for re-creating a group that has 
been dissolved  
Chapter III, Article 6 makes the re-creation or reorganization of 
a dissolved religious group a criminal offense. It is punishable by a 
three-year jail sentence and a 300,000 FF fine for the first offense 
and a five-year jail sentence and a 500,000 FF fine for repeat  
 
 
those individuals should be punished to the full extent of the law using existing criminal sanc-
tions. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (describing the 1998 Ministry of 
Justice circular encouraging local prosecutors to accelerate charges against NRMs thereby co-
operating with the Ministry’s fight against NRMs). 
 117. See Proposed Law, supra note 3, art. 1. Anti-sect associations have been granted le-
gal standing to sue as a party in interest alongside victims and their families. See FRANCE 
COUNTRY REPORT 2000, supra note 45; see also id. preamble (“Accorder aux associations le 
droit de se porter partie civile aux côtés des victimes constitute déjà un progrès important.”) 
(“Granting associations the right to sue as a ‘partie civile’ alongside the victims is already a 
considerable step forward.”) (translation by author). Thus, under the text of this Proposed 
Law, interested parties would include private associations, like the UNADFI and the CCMM. 
See supra notes 68 & 69. 
 118. See Proposed Law, supra note 3, art. 1. 
 119. See id. arts. 3-5. 
 120. See id. art. 2 (referring to French Penal Code art. 131-39[1]2). See also 31 THE 
AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE FRENCH PENAL CODE OF 1994, at 57 
(1999). 
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offenses.121 Article 7 calls for the dissolution of any illegally reconsti-
tuted religious entities.122 
4. Chapter IV: Restrictions on the location and communications of 
NRMs  
Chapter IV, Article 8 prohibits NRMs from establishing any 
physical presence within 100 meters of a hospital, retirement home, 
poor people’s home, kindergarten, or primary or secondary school, 
among other places.123 The Mayor (and in Paris, the Chief of Police) 
may forbid the establishment of NRMs who meet the two dissolu-
tion conditions established in Article 1.124 If such an order is vio-
lated, the penalty is a two-year jail sentence and a fine of 200,000 
FF.125 Article 9 prohibits groups deemed to satisfy Article 1’s dissolu-
tion conditions from disseminating information by any means that is 
aimed at young people and that promotes their religious move-
ment.126 Such dissemination of information is punishable by a fine of 
50,000 FF that is applicable to both organizations and individuals.127 
5. Chapter V: Criminalization of mental manipulation  
Chapter V, Articles 10 and 11 create the misdemeanor of “men-
tal manipulation,”128 which is defined as any activity 
with the goal or the effect to create or to exploit the psychological 
or physical dependence of those who participate in these activities 
and that undermines human rights or fundamental liberties; to ex-
ert on a person heavy and repeated pressure to create or exploit a 
state of dependency and drive a person, against his will or not, to 




 121. See Proposed Law, supra note 3, art. 6. 
 122. See id. art. 7. 
 123. See id. art. 8. The text of the Proposed Law was amended to read “200 meters” as a 
result of the Assembly debates. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. art. 9. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. art. 10. 
 129. Id. 
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This act is punishable by a two-year jail sentence and a fine of 
200,000 FF.130 The penalty increases to a five-year jail sentence and a 
fine of 500,000 FF if the individual allegedly victimized is someone 
with a particular vulnerability due to their age, illness, or infirmity.131 
The penalty applies to both corporations and individuals.132 
III. THE INVALIDITY OF FRANCE’S PROPOSED LAW AND ITS ANTI-
SECT POLICY UNDER FRANCE’S INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN 
COMMITMENTS TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
France’s Proposed Law and its anti-sect policy violate its obliga-
tions to religious liberty. Part III.A outlines the international and 
European treaties and covenants protecting religious liberty to which 
France has committed. Part III.B argues that France’s Proposed 
Law, specifically, and its anti-sect policy, generally, contravene these 
international and European obligations. 
A. France’s International and European Commitments to  
Religious Liberty 
As a member of the United Nations, the Organization for Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and the 
European Parliament, France has committed itself to numerous in-
ternational and European treaties and covenants that protect reli-
gious freedom. This part sets forth the pertinent language contained 
in these covenants and also the authoritative interpretations of these 
protections. 
1. International instruments 
France is committed to several significant international instru-
ments, the most relevant of which are the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)133 and the Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based 
on Religion or Belief (“1981 Declaration”).134 
 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. art. 11. 
 132. See id. art. 10. 
 133. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 69-82 (International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 134. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 102-04 (United Nations Declaration on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief) 
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a. The ICCPR. The United Nations adopted and opened for sig-
nature the ICCPR as United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
2200A (XXI) on December 16, 1966.135 It entered into force on 
March 23, 1976.136 France, as a party to the covenant,137 affirmed 
the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression as en-
shrined in Articles 18 and 19. Article 18 reads: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or 
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his free-
dom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms of others.138 
Article 18 thus ensures, among other things, freedom of religion 
and freedom to manifest one’s religion both individually and in con-
cert with others. This broad guarantee of religious liberty is fur-
thered by Subsection 2, which forbids any state coercion that would 
impede individual choice of religious belief. According to the text, 
these religious freedoms may only be limited by state action “neces-
sary” to preserve public safety, order, health, and so forth. 
Some interpret Article 18 as a provision that both giveth and ta-
keth away, reading Subsection 3 to authorize government to restrict 
religious freedom by liberally construing what constitutes a breach of 
public safety, order, health, or morals. However, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee has noted that unequal treatment of reli-
gious groups in the name of public order is only legitimate if the 
 
[hereinafter 1981 Declaration]. 
 135. See ICCPR, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 69. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 1999 Appendix A 
(1999) (listing each country’s status as a party or signatory to various international religious 
freedom conventions) [hereinafter STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT 1999]. 
 138. ICCPR, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 74. 
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treatment serves objective and reasonable purposes and the inequal-
ity is proportionate to accomplishing those purposes.139 This limita-
tion is necessary to ensure that the grants of Subsection 1 are not 
swallowed up by exceptions justified under Subsection 3. 
Finally, Articles 2 and 26 prohibit any form of discrimination 
based on religion, stating that all persons shall be guaranteed the 
“equal and effective” protection of the law.140 This guarantee is par-
ticularly important in the context of NRMs, which often are defined 
out of guarantees of religious liberties by governments because of 
NRMs’ nontraditional status.141 Addressing this precise issue, the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee interpreted Article 18 in 
its General Comment No. 22(48) by stating: 
The terms belief and religion are to be broadly construed. Article 
18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to re-
ligions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices 
analogous to those of traditional religions. The Committee there-
fore views with concern any tendency to discriminate against any 
religion or belief for any reasons, including the fact that they are 
newly established, or represent religious minorities that may be the 
subject of hostility by a predominant religious community.142 
The Human Rights Committee defines NRMs as within the 
scope of religions protected under Article 18, thus viewing any state 
attempts to discriminate against NRMs as suspect under the Cove-
nant. 
b. The 1981 Declaration. The United Nations General Assembly 
promulgated the 1981 Declaration as Resolution 36/55 on Novem-
ber 25, 1981,143 and France is a signatory.144 The 1981 Declaration 
is considered to be one of the most complete statements of interna-
 
 139. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra 9, at 92 (United Nations Human Rights Committee 
General Comment No. 22 (48)) [hereinafter U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. General Comment No. 
22]. 
 140. ICCPR, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 75; see also id. at 69. 
 141. See supra text accompanying notes 45-52. By defining NRMs as automatically dan-
gerous and therefore against the public order, the French government has attempted to cir-
cumvent the application of these principles to minority religions. The Human Rights Commit-
tee has clearly condemned this practice as violative of these international principles. 
 142. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. General Comment No. 22, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 9, at 92. 
 143. See 1981 Declaration, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 102. 
 144. See STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT 1999, supra note 137. 
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tional religious freedoms.145 While Article 1 echoes a guarantee of re-
ligious freedom very similar to that found in Article 18 of the 
ICCPR,146 successive portions of the 1981 Declaration are unique in 
several ways. 
First, in Article 2, the Declaration defines “intolerance and dis-
crimination based on religion or belief,”147 as “any distinction, exclu-
sion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having 
as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the rec-
ognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms on an equal basis.”148 
Second, Article 2 provides that “[n]o one shall be subject to dis-
crimination by any State, institution, group of persons or person on 
the grounds of religion or other beliefs.”149 This provision is unique 
in that it prohibits not only states but also private institutions and 
private persons from engaging in discrimination based on religion. 
Third, Article 4 requires that states take affirmative measures to 
“prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion.”150 
Furthermore, the Article obligates states to “make all efforts to enact 
or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any such  
 
 
 145. See Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 
487, 488 (1988). 
 146. Compare 1981 Declaration, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 103 (“Article 1[:] 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right 
shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion 
which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice. 3. Freedom to mani-
fest one’s religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedom of others.”), with ICCPR, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 74 (“Article 18[:] 1. 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall 
include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either indi-
vidually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief 
in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which 
would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 3. Freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others.”) (emphasis added). 
 147. 1981 Declaration, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 103. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
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discrimination, and to take all appropriate measures to combat intol-
erance on the grounds of religion or other beliefs in this matter.”151 
Finally, Article 6 enumerates the specific guarantees under the 
broad notion of religious freedom.152 These guarantees are subject to 
limitations “necessary to protect public safety, order, health or mor-
als or freedoms . . . of others.”153 Among the enumerated guarantees 
are the rights: 
(a) To worship or assemble in connexion [sic] with a religion or 
belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes; 
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitar-
ian institutions; 
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary 
articles and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or 
belief; 
(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these 
areas; 
(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these pur-
poses; 
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contribu-
tions from individuals and institutions; 
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate 
leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion 
or belief; 
(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremo-
nies in accordance with the precepts of one’s religion or belief; 
(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and 
communities in matters of religion and belief at the national and in-
ternational levels.154 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at 104. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
HSMI-FIN.DOC 10/12/00  3:14 PM 
1099] New Religious Movements in France 
 1127 
2. European commitments 
France has committed itself to two major European instruments 
protecting religious freedom: the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European 
Convention”)155 and the Concluding Document of the Vienna 
Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States of the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe (“Vienna Concluding 
Document”).156 These two instruments’ provisions will be discussed 
in turn, demonstrating France’s obligation: not only to uphold a set 
of religious freedoms, but also to foster a cultural climate that is tol-
erant towards religion. 
a. The European Convention. Opened for signature by the Coun-
cil of Europe on November 4, 1950, the European Convention en-
tered into force on September 3, 1953,157 and was ratified by France 
on May 3, 1974.158 In addition to establishing the European Com-
mission of Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights,159 
the European Convention protects various rights related to religion 
and belief.160 The pertinent portions of the European Convention 
include Articles 9, 11, and 14. Article 9 explicitly protects freedom 
of religion and belief: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in pub-
 
 155. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 140 (European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) [hereinafter European Convention]. 
 156. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 154 (Concluding Document of the Vienna 
Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe) [hereinafter Vienna Concluding Document]. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See Treaties of the Council of Europe Ratified by France (visited Mar. 18, 2000) 
<http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/ratstates/eratfra.htm>. 
 159. See The European Court of Human Rights (visited Mar. 15, 2000) <http://www. 
echr.coe.int/eng/INFORM> at Part I.A.2 (“In addition to laying down a catalogue of civil 
and political rights and freedoms, the Convention set up a system of enforcement of the obli-
gations entered into by Contracting States. Three institutions were entrusted with this respon-
sibility: the European Commission of Human Rights (set up in 1954), the European Court of 
Human Rights (set up in 1959) and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the 
latter organ being composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member States or their 
representatives.”). The ECHR has the power to interpret and enforce the European Conven-
tion. See discussion infra Part IV.C. for an analysis of the ECHR’s recent judgments interpret-
ing the European Convention’s religious liberty-related provisions. 
 160. See European Convention, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 140-41. 
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lic or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teach-
ing, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the pro-
tection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.161 
Article 11 ensures the rights to assemble peacefully and to form 
minority associations: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to 
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and 
to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights 
other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a de-
mocratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others. 
This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions 
on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of 
the police or of the administration of the state.162 
Similarly, Article 14 prevents discrimination based on religion, 
guaranteeing that “[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on 
any ground such as sex, race, colour, [sic] language, religion, politi-
cal or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a na-
tional minority, property, birth or other status.”163 
b. Vienna Concluding Document. France is also committed to the 
Helsinki Process by the Vienna Concluding Document.164 Adopted 
 
 161. See id. at 140. For a general discussion of the ECHR’s interpretation of Article 9, 
see MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE 262-
341 (1997); Malcolm N. Shaw, Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, in THE 
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 445 (R. St. F. Macdonald et 
al. eds., 1993); W. Cole Durham, Jr. et al., The Future of Religious Liberty in Russia: Report of 
the De Burght Conference on Pending Russian Legislation Restricting Religious Liberty, 8 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 162. See European Convention, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 141. 
 163. See id. For further interpretation of Article 9 by the European Court of Human 
Rights, see discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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in 1989,165 it elaborates specific principles regarding the freedom to 
profess and to practice religion or belief. France, as a participating 
member state of the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(“CSCE”), committed itself to the following principles: 
16. In order to ensure the freedom of the individual to profess and 
practice religion or belief[,] the participating States will, inter alia, 
16a. take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimina-
tion against individuals or communities, on the grounds of religion 
or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural life, and ensure the effective equality be-
tween believers and non-believers; 
16b. foster a climate of mutual tolerance and respect between believ-
ers of different communities as well as between believers and non-
believers . . . . 
17. The participating States recognize that the exercise of the 
above-mentioned rights relating to the freedom of religion or belief 
may be subject only to such limitations as are provided by law and 
consistent with their obligations under international law and with 
their international commitments. They will ensure in their laws and 
regulations and in their application the full and effective implemen-
tation of the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.166 
The Vienna Concluding Document thus has several significant 
features. First, the instrument suggests that its signatory states have a 
moral duty to ensure the prevention and elimination of discrimina-
tion based on religion. Second, the document emphasizes tolerance 
towards and between religious groups. Finally, any restriction placed 
on religious freedom must be provided for by domestic law (rather 
than administrative whim) and comply with international law and 
other international obligations. This means that limiting legislation  
 
 164. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (“CSCE”) was formed in 
July 1973 by 35 nations from Western and Eastern Europe, the USSR, the United States, and 
Canada. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 151. Pursuant to the Helsinki Final Act 
adopted at the CSCE’s initial conference in 1975, representatives of the participating CSCE 
States met in Vienna from November 4, 1986, through January 17, 1989. See Vienna Con-
cluding Document, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 154. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. at 155-56 (emphasis added). 
HSMI-FIN.DOC 10/12/00  3:14 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1130 
passed to protect the domestic public order cannot directly contra-
vene enumerated principles of international law. 
3. Conclusion 
The international and European treaties and covenants that 
France has signed explicitly commit France to protecting the reli-
gious liberty of all its citizens, not simply those of majority or tradi-
tional faiths. Indeed, the term “religion or belief” in these provisions 
has been authoritatively construed broadly, precisely to prevent states 
from simply defining out minority religious faiths. These protections 
not only forbid the enactment of discriminatory legislation by the 
state. They also mandate that the state implement affirmative meas-
ures to ensure a climate of tolerance for all religious believers and 
nonbelievers alike. Moreover, interpretations of these provisions de-
clare that tolerance and respect for diverse religious traditions build 
healthy democracies. Finally, any legislation justified by limitation 
clauses within these instruments must ensure that religious liberty 
principles are not circumvented under a pretext of protecting the 
public order. 
B. France’s Proposed Law and its Anti-Sect Policy Against its 
International and European Commitments 
1. France’s Proposed Law contravenes international law 
As previously indicated, the Proposed Law creates civil and 
criminal legal mechanisms that specifically target NRMs and would 
dissolve religious entities or impose serious burdens on the exercise 
of minority religious practices in France.167 These provisions violate 
established principles of international law in multiple ways. 
Article 1’s dissolution provision violates the rights of assembly 
and nondiscrimination. It sets a vague, apparently low threshold for 
the government to dissolve religious entities. More than one convic-
tion of a church’s leader(s) and an alleged intent to exploit the 
physical or psychological well-being of others makes an organization 
“dissolvable.” The nature of the convictions necessary to trigger dis-
solution is unclear; they could include practices that are inherently 
controversial in the religious context, such as the illegal practice of 
 
 167. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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medicine (by faith-healers), false advertising, and financial solicita-
tions. The open-ended number of convictions that trigger dissolu-
tion allows for much arbitrary administrative action.168 A determina-
tion that an organization is dissolvable places it in legal limbo. Even 
if it is not actually dissolved, its rights are limited by Articles 3, 4, 5, 
8, and 9 of the Proposed Law. 
The imminent threat of dissolution so burdens the operations of 
religious organizations that it violates Articles 6(a) and (b) of the 
1981 Declaration, Article 18 of the ICCPR, and Article 9 of the 
European Convention, which all guarantee the freedom to manifest 
religion or belief in community with others. By imposing the dissolu-
tion criteria to create a separate class of religious organizations, the 
Proposed Law violates the nondiscrimination principle embodied in 
Article 2 of the 1981 Declaration, Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR, 
and Article 16(a) of the Vienna Concluding Document. These guar-
antees reach beyond a formal equality to require “effective equal-
ity”169 and to prohibit any discriminatory purpose or effect based on 
religious preference.170 The term “religion or belief” as used in Arti-
cle 18 of the ICCPR has been broadly interpreted to embrace mi-
nority religions in order to prevent governments from doing pre-
cisely what the Proposed Law would do: create a separate category of 
religious organizations as a basis for differential treatment under the 
law. 
Articles 6 and 7 of the Proposed Law, which forbid and penalize 
the reconstitution of dissolved religious entities, violate the same 
provisions as Article 1. They serve to make permanent the depriva-
tion of religious rights resulting from dissolution. For a dissolved or-
ganization, the Proposed Law provides no avenue for reform and re-
demption because any reconstitution is similarly forbidden. 
Articles 2 through 5 of the Proposed Law, by extending criminal 
liability to a dissolvable organization and then penalizing that or-
ganization with a permanent ban on those religious activities that 
gave rise to the liability, directly attacks a range of religious practices. 
Under this regime, none of the rights explicitly guaranteed in Article 
6 of the 1981 Declaration is safe from permanent ban. As long as the 
 
 168. See supra note 111 (discussing the textual ambiguity in the Proposed Law). 
 169. Vienna Concluding Document, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 155. 
 170. Article 2 of the 1981 Declaration prohibits “any distinction” based on religious 
preference whose purpose or effect impairs the equal exercise of religious freedom. See 1981 
Declaration, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 103. 
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government can link religious practices to criminal liability, it can ef-
fectively control what religious practices survive. This invasive regula-
tion by the state—chilling controversial religious practices—violates 
Article 18.2 of the ICCPR, which prohibits government coercion in 
the religious marketplace. 
By granting city officials the discretion to substantially circum-
scribe the placement of dissolvable religious organizations, Article 8 
of the Proposed Law severely limits a central guarantee in the 1981 
Declaration: the right to establish and “maintain places” for assem-
bly, enumerated in Article 6(a). Thus, access limitations to various 
community institutions is not “prescribed by law,” as required by Ar-
ticle 11.2 of the European Convention, but by the whim of city offi-
cials. 
Article 9 of the Proposed Law similarly restricts the rights of dis-
solvable religious corporations by prohibiting any dissemination of 
any message, by whatever means, to youth. This flatly violates Article 
6(d) of the 1981 Declaration, which protects the right to dissemi-
nate religious publications as a manifestation of one’s religious belief. 
Article 9 also contradicts Article 6(e) of the 1981 Declaration and 
18.1 of the ICCPR, which both protect the right to teach one’s re-
ligion or belief. 
Articles 10 and 11 of the Proposed Law—which create the mis-
demeanor of mental manipulation—restrict potentially all NRMs, 
not merely those who qualify as dissolvable under Article 1. There-
fore, any NRM whose proselytism or teaching could be deemed to 
create a state of psychological or physical dependence in a follower 
could be liable under this provision. A suspect psychological theory 
that has been discredited by the American Psychological Associa-
tion,171 the “crime” of mental manipulation would cast the pall of il-
legality over most forms of religious proselytism and teaching, the 
lifeblood of NRMs. These provisions violate Articles 6(d) and (e) of 
the 1981 Declaration, which protect the rights of teaching and dis-
 
 171. See 1998 Introvigne Statement, supra note 4. For a discussion of the discrediting of 
the brainwashing theory within the context of new religious movements, see J. Gordon Mel-
ton, The Rise of the Study of New Religions 8-10 (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor) (documenting the discrediting of brainwashing theory by American academic associations 
and courts). See also GARAY, supra note 69, at 107-29 (arguing against the legal validity of 
mental manipulation claims); James T. Richardson, “Brainwashing” Claims and Minority Re-
ligions Outside the United States: Cultural Diffusion of a Questionable Concept in the Legal 
Arena, 1996 BYU L. REV. 873. 
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semination of religious information. The silencing of those NRMs 
convicted of mental manipulation—and the chilling effect on other 
NRMs—effectively impairs the public’s freedom to learn about or 
adopt a religion or belief. This coercive muting is explicitly forbidden 
by Article 18.2 of ICCPR. Significantly, mental manipulation reaches 
situations in which adherents willingly follow their religious leaders 
in acts or abstentions dictated by faith but which the state deems 
“heavily detrimental.” Thus, the state punishes religious leaders who 
exhort the faithful to live their religion. 
As a whole, the Proposed Law violates international law by 
overtly discriminating against NRMs, by punishing status rather than 
conduct, and by creating a climate of intolerance towards NRMs. 
First, the Proposed Law specifically targets NMRs in direct defiance 
of international instruments that bind states to prevent discrimina-
tion based on religion.172 Its very title—“A Law Proposal Aimed at 
Reinforcing the Prevention and the Repression against Groups with 
a Sectarian Character”173—trumpets its discriminatory thrust. This 
violates Articles 2 and 4 of the 1981 Declaration, which forbid dis-
crimination based on religion and require states to foster tolerance of 
different religious beliefs.174 Similarly, this targeting of NRMs con-
travenes Article 18 of the ICCPR,175 particularly in light of its au-
thoritative interpretation by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee: any religiously-based discrimination is particularly sus-
pect when the targets “are newly established, or represent religious 
minorities that may be the subject of hostility by a predominant reli-
gious community.”176 
Second, international treaties allow the state to limit religious 
liberties only when “necessary.”177 The French government has made 
 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 147-51, 163 & 166 (outlining nondiscrimination 
principles in Articles 2 and 4 of the 1981 Declaration, Article 14 of the European Convention, 
and Article 16 of the Vienna Concluding Document). 
 173. See Proposed Law, supra note 3. 
 174. See supra text accompanying notes 147-51 (discussing Articles 2 and 4 of the 1981 
Declaration). 
 175. See supra text accompanying note 163 (discussing Article 18 of the ICCPR). 
 176. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. General Comment No. 22, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 9, at 92. 
 177. Compare European Convention, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 141 (“Article 
9[: ]2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, 
for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.”) (emphasis added) with European Convention, BASIC DOCUMENTS, su-
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no showing that its Penal and Civil Code, without the Proposed 
Law, is insufficient to penalize unlawful conduct. Punishing unlawful 
behavior, rather than dissolving an entire religious entity, sufficiently 
deters similar unlawful conduct. The dissolution of an entire reli-
gious entity because of an individual member’s unlawful behavior 
violates the principle of proportionality central to Article 18.3 of the 
ICCPR.178 Such disproportional punishment reveals that the legisla-
tors aim not merely to penalize unlawful actions but to eliminate 
specific entities. 
Finally, the Proposed Law neglects France’s legal obligation to 
create an atmosphere of tolerance towards NRMs. Rather than fol-
low the Vienna Concluding Document’s mandate to take effective 
measures to “prevent and eliminate discrimination” against individu-
als or groups based on religion, the Proposed Law incites such dis-
crimination.179 In sum, the Proposed Law tears at a web of protected 
human rights that span international law. 
2. French anti-sect policy contravenes international law 
The violations of international treaties threatened by the Pro-
posed Law are only the latest manifestations of a disturbing pattern 
of religious discrimination in French policy towards NRMs. The 
French government has demonstrated a callous disregard for its in-
ternational commitments: refraining from state coercion as mandated 
by the ICCPR, taking affirmative measures to combat intolerance as 
required by the 1981 Declaration, and fostering a climate of toler-
ance as stipulated by the Vienna Concluding Document. 
 
 
pra note 9, at 141 (“Article 11[: ]2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these 
rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”) 
(emphasis added) with ICCPR, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 74 (“Article 18[: ]3. 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fun-
damental rights and freedoms of others.”) (emphasis added). 
 178. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has interpreted public order limita-
tions to be legitimate only if they serve objective and reasonable purposes and the inequality is 
proportionate to accomplishing those purposes. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. General Com-
ment No. 22, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 92. 
 179. Vienna Concluding Document, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 155-56. See 
supra text accompanying notes 164-66 (discussing Article 16 of the Vienna Concluding Docu-
ment). 
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The most troubling aspect in the preparation of the 1996 Sects in 
France Report was the lack of procedural safeguards. NRMs were 
black-listed without receiving a full and fair hearing and the list 
branded groups without giving any reason for their inclusion.180 Fur-
thermore, the French government has denied black-listed NRMs any 
recourse. There is no amendment procedure to remove groups from 
the list, short of a new Commission and Report.181 Articles 2 and 26 
of the ICCPR prohibit precisely this kind of state discrimination 
based on religion, which deprives citizens of “equal and effective” 
protection of the law.182 The significance of the 1996 list cannot be 
overstated: all subsequent reports have relied upon it as the baseline 
for segregating suspect religions. Due to the difficulty of defining 
what constitutes a secte, the 1996 list, by default, acts as a de facto 
definition of targeted NRMs.183 The creation of this list and subse-
quent measures have fostered a climate of intolerance towards 
NRMs, whose members have suffered significant marginalization and 
harassment.184 
In essence, France’s anti-sect policy offends international law be-
cause the policy is an attempt to regulate the choices of French citi-
zens with regard to their religious preferences. Article 18.2 of the 
ICCPR prohibits any attempts by the State to coerce individuals in 
their choice of religious belief and practice.185 At least one other legal 
scholar has suggested that the “protection of consumers in the reli-
gious marketplace” is riddled with dangerous difficulties.186 When 
the state seeks to protect the choices of its citizens from the influence 
of ignorance, misrepresentation, and fraud, it engages in a particu-
larly sensitive activity for several reasons. First, the regulation of a 
group because of its activities, rather than the regulation of the ac-
tivities themselves, is usually less effective and more threatening to 
religious freedom.187 Second, the determination of fraud or misrepre-
 
 180. See FRANCE COUNTRY REPORT 2000, supra note 45; see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 68-70. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42. 
 183. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74. 
 184. See supra text accompanying notes 95-101 (detailing incidents of discrimination re-
sulting from NRM status). 
 185. See ICCPR, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 74. 
 186. Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International Hu-
man Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251, 321. 
 187. See id. 
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sentation could potentially place the state in the position of deter-
mining the truth or falsity of religious beliefs, which is undesirable in 
a system based on the separation of church and state.188 Third, an at-
tempt to provide information to ensure “informed” decisions as to 
religious belief may often simply be an attempt to influence the ac-
tual results of those decisions.189  
Given these concerns, the state should not be involved in the 
gathering or disseminating of religious information, particularly 
when the state is committed to an agenda of “unveiling the truth” 
with respect to minority religious faiths. If the state does enter into 
the business of gathering or disseminating religious information, it 
must do so in an objective and neutral manner. This seems impossi-
ble given the strong anti-sect political forces in France and the 
French government’s alliance with the UNADFI and the CCMM, 
which both bear clear biases against NRMs.190 
IV. THE PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES BY PAN-EUROPEAN 
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 
As discussed in Part III, France’s anti-sect policy is disturbing 
because it runs contrary to the spirit and letter of its international 
obligations to protect religious freedom.191 More troubling, how-
ever, is the precedential influence that France’s anti-sect measures 
could have on pan-European institutions, most notably the Council 
of Europe, and on Eastern European countries looking for new 
models as they reinvent their governments. If France’s policy of se-
lective religious pluralism prevails as a leading model, these countries 
in transition will likely adopt increasingly restrictive laws, justified as 
emulations of the model of a western liberal democracy.192 
 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See supra notes 68 & 69 and accompanying text. 
 191. See discussion supra Part III. 
 192. See Religious Freedom in Western Europe: Religious Minorities and Growing Govern-
ment Intolerance Hearings Before the Comm’n on Sec. and Cooperation in Europe of the United 
States Congress, 106th Cong. 19 (June 8, 1999) (statement of Representative Christopher H. 
Smith) (“I was amazed how often people [in Russia] used the justification for disenfranchising 
certain religious denominations. They just pointed to Europe. They pointed to France. They 
just pointed to Austria and said, ‘Well, why don’t you bring your argument to these countries 
that have been around and have very settled jurisprudence?’”); Durham, supra note 1, at 216 
(arguing that developments in Western Europe regarding NRMs are often used as “justifica-
tions for even harsher legal provisions in Eastern Europe”). 
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While the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
seems to have been somewhat influenced in recent years by France’s 
anti-sect policy,193 other pan-European legislative and judicial institu-
tions have more successfully withstood the influence. The Parliament 
of the European Union has stated that democratic institutions based 
on the rule of law have no need to fear NRMs.194 However, some 
commentators express concern that France will use its position as the 
next president pro tempore of the European Union to advance its 
anti-sect policy.195 Whatever the vicissitudes of pan-European legisla-
tive bodies, decisions in pan-European courts—the Court of Justice 
for the European Communities and the European Court of Human 
Rights—have consistently reinforced principles of religious liberty 
and encouraged religious pluralism in democratic society. 
A. A Restrictive Shift in the Council of Europe’s Response to NRMs 
In the wake of France’s anti-sect policy, the Council of Europe’s 
(“COE”) Parliamentary Assembly196 has shifted somewhat its posi-
tion on appropriate responses toward NRMs. In the late 1980s, at 
the suggestion of the European Union Parliament, the Parliamentary 
Assembly considered the issue for the first time, a process that con-
cluded with the original draft of the COE’s Hunt Report, submitted 
in June 1991.197 
Notably, the Hunt Report explicitly stated that Article 9 of the 
European Convention made the passage of major legislation prohib-
iting sectes an “undesirable” option.198 This statement indicates rec-
ognition that legislation prohibiting sectes interferes with freedom of 
conscience and religion guaranteed under the Convention. The Re-
 
 193. See infra text accompanying notes 205-08 (describing the influence of French anti-
sect reports on the Council of Europe’s Natase Report). 
 194. See infra text accompanying notes 219-24. 
 195. See Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn, Remarks at the Capitol Hill Briefing Sponsored by The 
Institute on Religion and Public Policy (July 13, 2000). 
 196. The Parliamentary Assembly—which is made up of 286 representatives from the 
parliaments of the member states—is the deliberative body of the Council of Europe and 
makes policy recommendations to the Committee of Ministers. See About the Council of Europe 
(visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://www.coe.fr/eng/present/about.htm>. Comprised of the 
ministers of foreign affairs of the 41 member states, the Committee of Ministers has the discre-
tion and responsibility to execute the recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly. See id. 
 197. See Sects and New Religious Movements, Eur. Consult. Ass., Doc. No. 6535 (Nov. 
29, 1991). 
 198. See id. 
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port was eventually approved in 1992 as Recommendation 1178.199 
No action was taken to implement the Recommendation by the 
Committee of Ministers, the COE’s executive body. 
The conclusion of Recommendation 1178—that major legisla-
tion regarding NRMs was undesirable—has received only lip service 
in the wake of recent anti-sect fervor. On June 22, 1999, the Parlia-
mentary Assembly passed Recommendation 1412, entitled Illegal 
Activities of Sects.200 The Recommendation, largely a product of the 
COE’s Natase Report,201 acknowledged the prior recommendation 
against major legislation202 but went on to recommend serious legis-
lative measures aimed at NRMs both at the national and European 
level. The Assembly called on COE member states: 
(i) where necessary, to set up or support independent national or 
regional information centres on groups of a religious, esoteric or 
spiritual nature; (ii) to include information on the history and phi-
losophy of important schools of thought and of religion in general 
school curricula; (iii) to use the normal procedures of criminal and 
civil law against illegal practices carried out in the name of groups 
of a religious, esoteric or spiritual nature; (iv) to ensure that legisla-
tion on the obligation to enroll children at school is rigorously ap-
plied, and that appropriate authorities intervene in the event of 
non-compliance; (v) where necessary, to encourage the setting-up 
of non-governmental organisations for the victims, or the families 
of victims, of religious, esoteric or spiritual groups, particularly in 
eastern and central European countries; (vi) to encourage an ap-
proach to religious groups which will bring about understanding, 
tolerance, dialogue and resolution of conflicts; (vii) to take firm 
steps against any action which is discriminatory or which marginal-
ises [sic] religious or spiritual minority groups.203 
 
 199. Sects and New Religious Movements, Eur. Consult. Ass., 23rd Sess., Recommenda-
tion No. 1178 (1992) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://stars.coe.fr/ta/ta92/erec1178.htm> 
[hereinafter Recommendation No. 1178]. 
 200. Illegal Activities of Sects, Eur. Consult. Ass., 18th Sess., Recommendation No. 1412 
(1999) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://stars.coe.fr/ta/ta99/erec1412.htm> [hereinafter 
Recommendation No. 1412]. 
 201. Illegal Activities of Sects, Eur. Consult. Ass., Doc. No. 8373 (1999) (visited Mar. 
16, 2000) <http://stars.coe.fr/doc/doc99/edoc8373.htm> [hereinafter Natase Report]. 
 202. See Recommendation No. 1178, supra note 199, ¶ 5. 
 203. See Recommendation No. 1412, supra note 200, ¶ 10. The main concern with the 
establishment of observatories is their structure. If observatories collect and disseminate neutral 
and unbiased information regarding religious groups, then they may have a legitimate role in 
religious education. The author would still question whether the government should be in-
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The Assembly then recommended that the Committee of Minis-
ters: 
(i) . . . provide for specific action to set up information centres [sic] 
on groups of a religious, esoteric or spiritual nature in the countries 
of central and eastern Europe in its aid programmes [sic] for those 
countries; [and] (ii) set up a European observatory on groups of a 
religious, esoteric or spiritual nature to make it easier for national 
centres [sic] to exchange information.204 
The influence of the French model is apparent in the above pro-
visions. First, in drafting its recommendations, the COE’s Natase 
Report relied heavily upon the national legislative reports of France 
and Belgium that argued for restrictive legislation regarding 
NRMs.205 Indeed, the explanatory memorandum included with the 
Assembly’s draft recommendations referenced and reprinted selec-
tions from the French and Belgian reports.206 Second, the French 
 
volved in religious education at all. However, observatories either financially subsidized by 
anti-sect organizations or largely informed by them that disseminate anti-sect propaganda 
would be highly problematic. See infra note 211 (quoting the COE Swedish delegate’s con-
cerns with objectivity in information centers). 
 204. Recommendation No. 1412, supra note 200, ¶ 11. 
 205. See Natase Report, supra note 201. 
 206. See id. at Part II.B.6 (stating the COE Parliamentary Assembly’s reliance on the 
1995 French National Assembly Report); id. at Part II.E.1 (reprinting in the COE Parliamen-
tary Assembly’s Report recommendations made by the French Guyard Report). In addition to 
references to French legislative reports, it is significant to note that the same French Senator, 
Mr. About, who sponsored the French Senate bill of December 1999 upon which the Pro-
posed Law is based, is a deputy of the COE’s Parliamentary Assembly. Indeed, Mr. About ac-
tively participated in the debates over official adoption of the Natase Report; his contribution is 
translated and paraphrased in the Parliamentary Assembly’s transcript of the June 22, 1999, 
debates as follows: 
[I]llegal acts [a]re the defining feature of sects and so there [i]s no relation between 
sects and religions. It [i]s not the sects’ beliefs which [a]re in question but their ac-
tivities, which [a]re illegal and contravene[] human rights. Council of Europe mem-
ber states need[] to intensify their exchange of information to combat the problem, 
particularly because sects [a]re often organised [sic] across national frontiers. They 
also need[] to identify ways of tackling the problem at an international level and to 
ensure that sects d[o] not have a voice in the international arena. It was wrong that 
France had been condemned for speaking out against sects in the OSCE [Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe]. In this respect, parliamentary control 
of non-governmental organisations [sic] [i]s needed to ensure that the organisations 
[sic] d[o] not have to operate to promote the activities of sects. It [i]s particularly 
important to protect the weaker members of society, and the French Parliament 
ha[s] just passed a resolution about the schooling of children in order to strengthen 
this protection. 
EUR. PARL. ASS. DEB. 18th Sess. (June 22, 1999) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://stars.coe.fr 
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model of government cooperation with private anti-sect organiza-
tions (like the UNADFI and the CCMM)207 is reflected in the As-
sembly’s recommendations. By stressing that member states’ gov-
ernments encourage the establishment of anti-sect organizations in 
Eastern Europe, the Assembly writes a recipe to repeat French re-
pressive policy towards NRMs in Eastern Europe.208 
The stated organizational aims of the COE are to strengthen 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law throughout its mem-
ber states and to harmonize member states’ laws in furtherance of 
these human rights protections.209 None of these goals is furthered 
by the Assembly’s recommendation. The Assembly’s demonstrated 
reliance on French policy in the COE’s Natase Report will likely be 
imitated in the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe. There is a 
danger that the French model will be transported to societies that do 
not have long histories of religious tolerance and that are attempting 
to reform their government structures away from discredited au-
thoritarianism. Harmonization towards this model of selective reli-
gious pluralism warrants concern. 
B. The Response of the European Parliament and its Member States to 
the Anti-Sect Phenomenon 
Responses to the anti-sect phenomenon by individual Member 
States of the European Union have varied dramatically.210 The Swed-
 
/verbatim/9906/e/9909221000e.htm> (statement of Mr. About) [hereinafter Natase Report 
Debates]. 
 207. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
 208. Quite contrary to the French model, the Assembly should be lauded for including 
points six and seven, which reaffirm tolerance towards minority religions and admonish states 
to take affirmative steps to eliminate discrimination. It is clear from the Assembly’s debates that 
many representatives felt that the inclusion of these two points provided balance to the rec-
ommendation. See Natase Report Debates, supra note 206. Other committees forwarded pro-
posed amendments that would have eliminated points six and seven. See Illegal Activities of 
Sects, Eur. Consult. Ass., Doc. No. 8379 (Apr. 20, 1999) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) 
<http://stars.coe.fr/doc/doc99/edoc8379.htm> (amendments forwarded by the Social, 
Health, and Family Affairs Committee, Rapporteur Mr. Hegyu, Socialist group, Hungary); 
Illegal Activities of Sects, Eur. Consult. Ass., Doc. No. 8383 (Apr. 21, 1999) (visited Mar. 16, 
2000) <http://stars.coe.fr/doc/doc99/edoc8383.htm> (amendments forwarded by the 
Committee on Culture and Education, Rapporteur Mr. de Puig, Socialist group, Spain). These 
amendments were rejected during Assembly debate because they would have imbalanced the 
recommendation. See Natase Report Debates, supra note 206. 
 209. See About the Council of Europe, supra note 196. 
 210. See Willy Fautré, Address delivered at the Center for the Study of Religion in Public 
Life, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut (Sept. 26-27, 1999) (transcript available at Re-
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ish government’s response has been among the more tolerant. It au-
thorized a parliamentary commission and report on sectes and, after 
criticizing anti-sect inquiries elsewhere on methodological grounds, 
concluded that existing legislative and criminal sanctions were suffi-
cient for any illegal activity.211 
 
 
pression of Minority and Non-conventional Religions in Western Europe: Human Rights Implica-
tions (last modified Oct. 19, 1999) <http://www. hrwf.net/html/Hartford99.html>) (noting 
that 11 out of the 15 Member States of the European Union have concluded that sectes do not 
pose a sufficient threat to merit the creation of new institutions to combat their influence). See 
generally Richardson & Van Driel, supra note 1. 
 211. See Willy Fautré, Address delivered at the OSCE Implementation Meeting in War-
saw (Oct. 26, 1998) (transcript available at OSCE Implementation Meeting in Warsaw: Speech 
delivered by “Human Rights Without Frontiers” (last modified Oct. 19, 1999) <http://www. 
hrwf.net/html/warsaw.html>) (documenting the Swedish report’s reproach of France for 
“mak[ing] common cause with the anti-cult movement” against NRMs); Willy Fautré, The 
Cult Issue in Western Europe and Religious Intolerance: Policies of the 15 Member States of the 
European Union with Regard to the Sect Issue (last modified Oct. 19, 1999) <http://www. 
hrwf.net/html/CSCE99.html> (listing the Swedish Parliamentary Commission’s response that 
existing legislative and penal sanctions are sufficient to counteract any illegal activity by mem-
bers of sectes.) 
  It should be noted that the Swedish delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe issued the most protective statement of religious liberties for NRMs. Mrs. 
Näslund expressed concern over the still-vague definition of sectes and questioned whether the 
Council of Europe had taken seriously enough its task to protect human rights. With respect to 
information centers on sectes, Mrs. Näslund stated: 
The proposed information centers should be completely independent of states. In-
formation should be balanced and unbiased and research should be undertaken by 
academics who have studied these matters in depth. Douwe Korff [an international 
human rights lawyer, course director of the European Convention on Human 
Rights program at the University of Essex in the United Kingdom and a fellow at 
the Human Rights Center at the same university has stated:] 
It is also clearly confirmed in established international legal principles that any 
information disseminated on minority religious groups or movements should 
be objective, non-emotive and based on tolerance and understanding. Differ-
ent groups should not all be tarred with the same brush. On the contrary, in-
formation on any particular group should relate to specific activities of the 
group concerned and not based on generalised [sic] judgements based on se-
lective examples taken from different groups. 
  Any attempts by the state (or by state bodies such as the proposed information 
centres [sic]) to indoctrinate individuals (including children) against new or minor-
ity religions in general or against specific groups, for examle [sic] by issuing biased, 
subjective or generalised [sic] negative information, which could engender hatred 
towards the minority groups in question, would not just contravene the principles of 
openness and tolerance on which the Council of Europe is founded and the right to 
freedom of religion and belief in particular, but could even constitute offences under 
international criminal law. 
Natase Report Debates, supra note 206 (statement of Mrs. Näslund). 
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At the other extreme, the most drastic responses have emanated 
from France, Belgium, Germany, and Austria.212 Belgium, for exam-
ple, established a parliamentary commission to investigate NRMs, 
created a list of sectes, authorized an observatory to monitor their ac-
tivities, funded a mass distribution of brochures notifying the public 
of secte dangers, and created a specific government agency to combat 
sectes.213 Germany’s response included the creation of a parliamentary 
commission to investigate NRMs, heightened monitoring of NRMs 
(particularly the Church of Scientology), and the mass distribution of 
anti-sect brochures by the Ministries of Religious Affairs.214 Likewise, 
Austria funded the mass distribution of a brochure that black-listed 
various groups as sectes and established an information center on sec-
tes.215 
While these Member States have targeted NRMs on a national 
level, the European Parliament in recent years generally has acted as 
a calming influence against the wave of anti-sect sentiment. The tol-
erance of the 1990s represents an improvement over the more re-
strictive 1980s. The highly controversial 1984 Cottrell Report,216 
which passed the Parliament after considerable modifications, urged 
 
 212. See Willy Fautré, Address delivered at the Center for the Study of Religion in Public 
Life, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut (Sept. 26-27, 1999) (transcript available at Re-
pression of Minority and Non-conventional Religions in Western Europe: Human Rights Implica-
tions (last modified Oct. 19, 1999) <http://www. hrwf.net/html/Hartford99.html>) (listing 
the government responses in France, Belgium, Germany, and Austria as the most severe against 
NRMs). 
 213. See 1998 Fautré Statement, supra note 46 (Belgium); 1998 Introvigne Statement, 
supra note 4 (Belgium). For a discussion of church-state relations in Belgium, see generally Rik 
Torfs, State and Church in Belgium, in STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra 
note 9, at 15. 
 214. See 1998 Fautré Statement, supra note 46 (Germany); 1998 Introvigne Statement, 
supra note 4 (Germany). For a discussion of church-state relations in Germany, see generally 
Gerhard Robbers, State and Church in Germany, in STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, supra note 9, at 57. 
 215. See The Treatment of Religious Minorities in Western Europe Hearing Before the 
House Comm. on Int’l Relations of the United States Congress, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement 
of Philip Brumley, General Counsel for Jehovah’s Witnesses). For a discussion of restrictive 
registration laws recently passed in Austria that adversely affect NRMs, see generally Christo-
pher J. Miner, Comment, Losing My Religion: Austria’s New Religion Law in Light of Interna-
tional and European Standards of Religious Freedom, 1998 BYU L. REV. 607. For a discussion 
of church-state relations in Austria, see generally Richard Potz, State and Church in Austria, in 
STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 9, at 229. 
 216. For a general discussion of the 1984 Cottrell Report, see James T. Richardson, Mi-
nority Religions, Religious Freedom, and the New Pan-European Political and Judicial Institu-
tions, 37 J. CHURCH & ST. 39, 49-52 (1995). 
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Member States to exchange information “with particular reference to 
procedures for conferring charitable status; compliance with the law; 
attempts to find missing persons; infringements of personal free-
doms; creation of centers to assist defectors; and legal loopholes 
permitting NRMs to transfer activities proscribed in one country to 
another.”217 More importantly, the Cottrell Report called for a 
common approach to the problem by all European states, including 
a call for the Council of Europe to pass resolutions on the issue.218 
The Council of Ministers did not act on the recommendations of the 
Cottrell Report.219 
The 1997 Civil Liberties Committee’s Report on Sects (“Berger 
Report”)220 reversed the Parliament’s course. The Berger Report 
called on Member States to apply existing legal provisions and in-
struments effectively and to ascertain whether there were sufficient 
provisions—particularly in the areas of the law on associations, cor-
poration law, tax and social security law, and criminal law—to pro-
tect the public from sectes’ unlawful activities.221 The Berger Report 
reaffirmed the inappropriateness of any specific legislation against sec-
tes by affirming that existing legal actions were a sufficient sanction 
against any possible unlawful activity by NRMs.222 
Notwithstanding this more moderate approach, the Berger Re-
port was rejected for a second time by plenary session in 1998 and 
sent back to the Civil Liberties Committee for further considera-
tion.223 The rejection may be explained by the opinion of many 
European Union Parliament representatives who considered the secte 
danger a non-issue: “[t]here is no reason to fear that the firmly-
established democratic institutions based on the rule of law in all the 
members states are in immediate danger.”224 
 
 217. Id. at 51. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See id. 
 220. Report on Sects in the European Union, EUR. PARL. DOC. (A4-0408/97) (1997) 
(visited Sept. 20, 2000) <http://www.europarl.eu.int> [hereinafter Berger Report]. 
 221. See id. 
 222. See id. 
 223. The Berger Report has not been resubmitted to the entire body of the European 
Parliament. 
 224. See 1998 Fautré Statement, supra note 46. For a general discussion on the applica-
tion of existing criminal sanctions as opposed to additional punitive measure, see Rik Torfs, Les 
nouveaux mouvements religieux et le droit dans l’union européene: rapport general, in NEW  
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While anti-sect sentiment continues to foment at the national 
level in some European Union Member States, the prevailing senti-
ment among representatives in political bodies of the European Un-
ion is thus one of confidence in existing legal remedies for potential 
infractions by groups or individual members of sectes. This more con-
sidered, rational approach—demonstrated through the European 
Union’s inaction on the issue—encourages Member States to have 
confidence in the rule of law and the judicial process to punish any 
illegal activity involving NRMs. 
C. Recent Pan-European Court Rulings Upholding Religious Liberty 
Despite the reversals of pan-European legislative bodies,225 pan-
European judicial systems have adamantly upheld principles of reli-
gious liberty in the face of rising anti-sect sentiment. The principal 
pan-European courts are the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”) and the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(“ECJ”). The rulings of both courts have consistently recognized 
specific NRMs as religious and legal entities, fully deserving of pro-
tection under applicable international treaties. The courts have up-
held NRMs’ rights to exercise a full range of religious liberties with-
out repressive interference by the state. 
1. ECHR rulings 
The ECHR has primary authority to interpret and enforce the 
European Convention.226 While it is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment to address all of the ECHR’s cases involving violations of Arti-
cle 9 of the European Convention, this subsection will briefly outline 
how the ECHR has upheld freedom of religion under Article 9, spe-
cifically within the context of NRMs. 
The ECHR determined the scope of Article 9 protections in 
Kokkinakis v. Greece.227 In that case, Mr. Kokkinakis, a Jehovah’s 
Witness, had been sentenced to imprisonment under a Greek law 
 
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS AND THE LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 1, at 37-66 
(presenting three models of responses to the secte phenomenon). 
 225. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 226. See European Convention, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 140. See discussion 
supra Part III.A.2.a. (outlining the relevant religious-liberty provisions of the European Con-
vention). 
 227. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 
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that made proselytizing an offense.228 Mr. Kokkinakis claimed that 
his conviction breached his religious liberties protected under Article 
9 of the European Convention. The ECHR held that the Greek law 
as applied to Mr. Kokkinakis violated Article 9, but the court did not 
explicitly hold whether the legislation on its face was similarly viola-
tive.229 
In its reasoning, the court outlined the general principles en-
shrined in Article 9, including both internal and external compo-
nents. The court first discussed the internal component: 
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the founda-
tions of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the Conven-
tion. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements 
that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of 
life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics 
[sic] and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable [sic] from a 
democratic society, which has been so dearly won over the centu-
ries, depends on it.230 
Apart from this internal freedom, the court recognized the external 
manifestation of one’s religious beliefs as integral to Article 9 protec-
tions. “Bearing witness in words and deeds is bound up with the ex-
istence of religious convictions.”231 According to the court, such 
bearing witness “includes in principle the right to try to convince 
one’s neighbor”232 without which, the court noted, the freedom to 
change one’s religion or belief, as enshrined in Article 9, would be “a 
dead letter.”233 Finally, the court stressed that Article 9’s limitation 
clause applied only to the external component or manifestations of 
one’s religious belief, recognizing that “in democratic societies, in 
which several religions coexist within one and the same population, 
it may be necessary to place restrictions on this freedom in order to 
reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that every-
one’s beliefs are respected.”234 
  
 
 228. See id. ¶¶ 6-7. 
 229. See P. VAN DIJK & G.H.J. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 555 (3d. ed. 1998). 
 230. Kokkinakis, ¶ 31. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. ¶ 33. 
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 Applying these general principles to Mr. Kokkinakis’s conviction, 
the court engaged in a three-part analysis to determine if the applica-
tion of the Greek law had violated Article 9. An interference with the 
right to manifest one’s belief was contrary to Article 9 unless it was: 
(1) “prescribed by law,” (2) directed at one or more of the legiti-
mate aims articulated in the limitation clause of Article 9, and (3) 
“necessary in a democratic society” for achieving those aims.235 First, 
the ECHR, deferring to prior Greek court precedent, held that the 
measure under which Mr. Kokkinakis had been convicted was “pre-
scribed by law” within the meaning of Article 9.236 Second, the court 
held that, given the circumstances of the case, the state’s purpose “to 
protect a person’s religious beliefs and dignity from attempts to in-
fluence them by immoral and deceitful means”237 was sufficiently di-
rected at a legitimate aim, “namely the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.”238 
 On the third prong of its analysis, the court found a violation. 
The court was careful to give the Contracting States due deference, 
which the court referred to as a “margin of appreciation,” wherein 
the Contracting States must assess the “existence and extent of the 
necessity of an interference” with protected manifestations of reli-
gious belief.239 But the court recognized its role as determining 
“whether the measures taken at a national level were justified in prin-
ciple and [were] proportionate.”240 Ultimately, the court held that 
the Greek government had not shown that Mr. Kokkinakis’s convic-
tion was justified by a “pressing social need.”241 Moreover, the court 
determined that the harsh penalty imposed for proselytizing was not 




 235. Id. ¶ 36. 
 236. Id. ¶¶ 40-41. 
 237. Id. ¶ 42. 
 238. Id. ¶ 44. 
 239. Id. ¶ 47. 
 240. Id. ¶ 47. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., The Distinctive Roles of Church and State, 1998 
FIDES ET LIBERTAS 39, 41 (“In modern legal systems this proportionality test is now crucial to 
determine whether state action that burdens religious freedom is legitimate or not. Note that 
while the sphere of freedom provided by this approach is smaller, the protection it provides is 
larger and stronger.”). 
 241. Kokkinakis, ¶ 49. 
 242. See id. 
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not “necessary in a democratic society . . . for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.”243 
In 1996, the ECHR was confronted with a second case involving 
a claim under Article 9 of the Convention, Manoussakis and Others v. 
Greece,244 which involved “a clear tendency on the part of the 
[Greek] administrative and ecclesiastical authorities to use [certain 
legal provisions] to restrict the activities of faiths outside of the Or-
thodox church.”245 Mr. Manoussakis, also a Jehovah’s Witness, was 
convicted for operating a place of worship in violation of a Greek law 
requiring the prior authorization of the Minister of Education and 
Religious Affairs in consultation with authorities of the Greek Or-
thodox Church.246 The court found a violation of Article 9 of the 
Convention.247 Again, the court did not decide the case on the first 
two prongs of analysis, finding it unnecessary to determine if the in-
terference was “prescribed by law”248 and determining that the gov-
ernment measure was legitimately aimed at the protection of the 
public order.249 
In the third-prong analysis of whether the government measures 
were “necessary in a democratic society,” the ECHR reiterated the 
margin of appreciation given to Contracting States, but reminded 
the government that true religious pluralism was at stake in this cal-
culus.250 At bottom, the court was uncomfortable with the “far-
reaching interference by the political, administrative and ecclesiastical 
authorities with the exercise of religious freedom.”251 Not only did 
the formal provisions of the law confer wide discretion on local offi-
cials to deny authorizations, but in practice, the possibility for abuse 
of discretion was highly probable.252 The court emphatically con-
 
 243. Id. 
 244. Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. Judgments & Dec. 
1346 (1996). 
 245. LEADING CASES OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 536 n.11 (R.A. 
Lawson & H.G. Schermers eds., 1997). 
 246. See Manoussakis, ¶¶ 6-15. 
 247. See id. ¶ 53. 
 248. See id. ¶ 38. 
 249. See id. ¶ 40. Significantly, in the court’s discussion of whether the regulation sought 
a legitimate aim, the court affirmed that the Jehovah’s Witnesses fall within the definition of a 
“known religion.” Id. ¶ 40. 
 250. See id. ¶ 44. 
 251. Id. ¶ 45. 
 252. See id. 
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cluded that the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the 
Convention “excludes any discretion on the part of the State to de-
termine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such 
beliefs are legitimate.”253 Because of significant evidence that the 
state had “tended to use the possibilities afforded by the above-
mentioned provisions to impose rigid, or indeed prohibitive, condi-
tions on practice of religious beliefs by certain non-Orthodox move-
ments, in particular Jehovah’s Witnesses,”254 the court held that the 
law as applied violated Article 9 of the Convention.255 
While some scholars suggest that the ECHR is reluctant to de-
cide freedom of religion cases under Article 9,256 the court has pro-
vided significant precedent that upholds NRMs’ religious freedoms 
under the European Convention. 
2. ECJ ruling 
A recent ECJ257 determination bodes well for the rights of NRMs 
under the European Union Treaty as well.258 In Association Église de 
Scientologie de Paris & Scientology International Reserves Trust v. The 
Prime Minister,259 the Church of Scientology brought suit against 
 
 253. Id. ¶ 47. 
 254. Id. ¶ 48. 
 255. See id. ¶ 53. As in Kokkinakis, the court declined to decide whether this type of leg-
islation is per se incompatible with Article 9. See VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 229, at 
555.  
 256. See, e.g., C.A. Gearty, The European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of 
Civil Liberties: An Overview, 52 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 89-127 (1993); Richardson, supra note 216, 
at 41-49. 
 257. The ECJ is the highest court of appeal for the fifteen Member States of the Euro-
pean Union. See K.P.E. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 1, 94-97 (2d. ed. 1994); Catherine Turner, Human Rights Protection in the 
European Community: Resolving Conflict and Overlap Between the European Court of Justice 
and the European Court of Human Rights, 5 EUR. PUB. L. 453, 459 (1999). Because the ECJ 
deals mainly with trade and economic matters under the European Treaty, it decides cases in-
volving religious liberties less often than does the ECHR. See Turner, supra, at 459-60. For a 
discussion of the two courts overlapping jurisdictions in protecting human rights, see generally 
Turner, supra. 
 258. See La scientologie aidée par le droit européen, LIBÉRATION, Mar. 15, 2000; La scien-
tologie gagne contre la France devant la Cour européene de justice, LA CROIX, Mar. 15, 2000; 
L’Eglise de scientologie emporte un succès contre Paris, LE MONDE, Mar. 16, 2000; Un point 
pour la Scientologie, FRANCE SOIR, Mar. 15, 2000. 
 259. Case 54/99, Association Église de Scientologie de Paris & Scientology International 
Reserves Trust v. Prime Minister, 2000 E.C.R. __ (visited Mar. 17, 2000) <http://europa.eu. 
int/jurisp>. 
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the Prime Minister in the French Conseil d’État.260 The Church of 
Scientology requested that the court repeal a system of prior au-
thorizations for direct foreign investment to NRMs, which invest-
ments were considered by the French law to “represent a threat to 
public policy . . . or public security.”261 Under the system of prior au-
thorizations, the government refused to authorize the Church of 
Scientology in Paris to import foreign funds to pay sixty percent 
taxes levied by the French government on manual donations (dons 
manuels) to the church.262 As a result, the system of requiring prior 
authorizations threatened the very existence of the Paris church. 
The Conseil d’État referred to the ECJ the question of whether 
the system of prior authorizations was compatible with the Commu-
nity-law principle of the free movement of capital under the Treaty. 
The ECJ, in its March 14, 2000, determination, held that the system 
was not compatible with this standard. The ECJ explained that a sys-
tem of prior restraints that restricts movement of capital can only be 
justified by public policy or public security concerns. But, the court 
explained, such concerns must be strictly construed and must be 
made subject to review by the Community institutions. Therefore, 
the public policy grounds used to justify restricting the free move-
ment of capital must be genuine, sufficiently serious, and address a 
fundamental interest of society. Applying this standard, the court 
held that the foreign investors were given “no indication whatever as 
to the specific circumstances in which prior authorization is re-
quired.”263 Thus, the ECJ held that the regulation was “contrary to  
 
 
 260. The Conseil d’État (“Council of State”) is the supreme administrative tribunal of the 
French administrative courts, located within the executive branch. See RENÉ DAVID, FRENCH 
LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY 24 (Michael Kindred trans., 1972). 
The administrative courts generally have jurisdiction to determine the legality of administrative 
actions and have power to afford monetary redress to those injured as a result of a public ser-
vant’s wrongful action. See WESTON, supra note 89, at 87. The Conseil d’État statutorily re-
tains original and final jurisdiction over cases concerning the legality of decrees and ministerial 
regulations, among other things. See id. at 88. 
 261. See Case 54/99, ¶ 7. The challenged system of prior authorizations consists of a set 
of laws that govern financial relations with foreign countries. The pertinent articles quoted by 
the ECJ included the following: Articles 1, 3(1)(c), and 5-1(1)(1) of Law No. 66-1008 of 28 
December 1966 on financial relations with foreign countries; Articles 11, 11(a), 12, and 13 of 
Decree No. 89-938 of 29 December 1989. See Case 54/99, ¶¶ 5-11. 
 262. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (describing dons manuels and relevant 
taxes on the same). 
 263. Case 54/99, ¶ 21. 
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the principle of legal certainty” because it did not apprise individuals 
of the extent of their rights and obligations under the Treaty.264 
The case then returned to the Conseil d’État where the tax as-
sessment was overturned.265 These combined rulings are of monu-
mental significance for NRMs in France, some of which are branches 
of international churches with coordinated financial management 
systems. Without these rulings, NRMs would have been restricted 
from importing foreign funds to satisfy taxes imposed by the French 
government based on their NRM status, which could threaten their 
very existence in France. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The French National Assembly’s Proposed Law and France’s 
anti-sect policy explicitly target NRMs in direct contravention of 
international and European treaties and conventions. The Proposed 
Law is France’s most recent attempt—and perhaps its most lethal—
to eliminate those new religious movements that the French gov-
ernment deems to be a threat to the public order. The French gov-
ernment should reject the Proposed Law and alter its other anti-sect 
measures so as to afford minority religious faiths greater protections. 
If France persists in its anti-sect campaign, apart from the bur-
densome effects of these restrictive legislative measures on NRM 
members in France, the French model threatens to have highly det-
rimental precedential effects upon Eastern European countries. In-
deed, the French model may have already influenced the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s recommendation which 
urged member states, specifically Eastern European countries, to 
support the establishment of private anti-sect organizations and in-
formation centers. 
Notwithstanding the Council of Europe’s recommendations, the 
French model appears to have had less influence on numerous other 
pan-European organizations. The Parliament of the European Union 
has repeatedly affirmed a more reasoned approach by emphasizing 
the use of existing national legal sanctions for illegal conduct. The 
European Court of Human Rights has defended fundamental inter-
national principles of religious liberty, ruling in cases that specifically 
deal with NRMs in European countries, that various restrictive regu-
 
 264. Id. ¶ 22. 
 265.  See FRANCE COUNTRY REPORT 2000, supra note 45. 
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lations violate Article 9 of the European Convention. Finally, the 
Court of Justice for the European Communities’ recent holding fa-
voring an NRM under the European Treaty could dampen future 
French anti-sect measures. These judicial pronouncements by pan-
European courts send a signal to France that its anti-sect policy can-
not stand against governing international principles of religious lib-
erty. 
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